Workshop Report

India's Role in Global Cooperation: Curbing or Shaping World Politics? with comparative perspectives from the BRICS and IBSA context

Duisburg, 11 June 2013

Workshop organised by:
Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21) and Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)
On 11 June 2013 the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21) and the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) jointly hosted an international workshop entitled ‘India’s Role in Global Cooperation: Curbing or Shaping World Politics? With Comparative Perspectives from the BRICS and IBSA Context’. The aim of the workshop was to draw together the discourse on Indian economic growth – in the context of the increasing economic and political influence of the BRICS grouping – and the discourse on historical changes in Indian concepts of foreign policy.

In his introductory remarks, Professor Tobias Debiel, Executive Director of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, spoke of the potential influence of emerging powers on the global system, and of the prospects for cooperation. He also described the theme of the workshop as being core to the Centre’s own research – past and present – as previously on Brazil and China.

Session 1:

The Basis of India’s Global Aspirations – Historical Changes in Indian Foreign Policy

The first session of the workshop, chaired by Dr Cornelia Ulbert, Executive Director of the Institute for Development and Peace, opened with a short introduction of the panellists. The floor was then given over to Professor Herbert Wulf, Senior Expert Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research. Professor Wulf’s presentation drew on his recently published work India’s Aspirations in Global Politics – Competing Ideas and Amorphous Practices, the latest in the INEF Report series.

Professor Herbert Wulf:
Domestic Factors Influencing India’s Foreign-Policy Concepts

Professor Wulf began by explaining that since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, Indian foreign policy had rested on two main pillars: in the political arena, the continued existence of the former Non-Aligned Movement, and in the economic arena a clear position of independence and autarky. Although these pillars continued to be present, said Professor Wulf, concepts of foreign policy were nowadays also influenced
by internal structures. What then, he asked, was the institutional set-up underlying economic development and the advent of democracy?

Indian Paradoxes

Taking a closer look at these domestic factors, Professor Wulf remarked that India was a country of paradoxes. It was the largest democracy in the world but was riddled with corruption. It was one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, yet large sections of its society were underdeveloped and impoverished. It ranked amongst the emerging powers and at the same time suffered both from internal dissension and from conflict with its neighbours. Citing Amartya Sen – ‘India [is] moving in the direction of being half California and half sub-Saharan Africa’ – Professor Wulf pointed out that it was the urban areas which were benefiting the most from economic growth and that the country as a whole was marked by a strong urban–rural divide. Despite this, he said, India enjoyed a better Gini coefficient (as a measure of income-inequality) than any other BRICS country. As far as internal security-threats were concerned, the most severe in his view were Islamist terrorism, ethno-religious fundamentalism, and left-wing Naxalite/Maoist extremism.

Four Concepts of Foreign Policy in Indian History

Professor Wulf then shifted to the historical perspective and took a look at Indian foreign-policy concepts. Over the last sixty years, he said, there had been four dominant concepts. The first was Idealism (of which Prime Ministers Nehru and Gujral were celebrated exponents). This involved constructing foreign policy on a moral basis, with particular emphasis on independence and non-alignment. The second was Realism – still in operation today – which put the stress on economic strength and military (nuclear) capability. Thirdly came Hindu nationalism – an old ideology dating from the pre-independence period – which, in addition to its nationalism and chauvinism, counted a strong military as one of its cornerstones. The fourth and last of India’s foreign-policy concepts, said Professor Wulf, was a combination of (Neo-)Liberalism and liberal Internationalism, both of which advocated deregulation of the economy and were strongly state-centric – and both of which were, again, still operational today.

The Constant Search for Alternatives

Drawing together his remarks on India’s domestic situation and his outline of its four foreign-policy concepts, Professor Wulf identified three factors relating to domestic structure which might help to explain the nature of Indian foreign policy. The first, he said, was the ‘hybridisation’ of India, in the sense of the integration of tradition and modernity. The same sort of hybridisation could be found in foreign policy, with Persian influences appearing alongside Western institutions amongst the political, artistic, and economic elites. Created not by reason but by a centuries-long
process of evolution, the products of this hybridisation, he said, were complex social structures and resilient institutions. A second explanatory factor, he thought, was India’s ‘amorphous institutions’. He described the situation as one of ‘good planning but poor implementation’ and concluded that improvisation – and the constant search for alternatives – was a characteristically Indian approach to problem-solving. A third element, he believed, was the country’s well-functioning federalism. Being open to cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy, Indian federalism had indeed led to the creation of new states but never to the Balkanisation of the country. From the point of view of political structures, this federalism acted as a counter-balance in conflicts between ‘push and pull states’ or between states and the centre.

**Hidden Problems of the ‘Rising Indian Star’**

Summing up, Professor Wulf concluded that Indian economic success and growth could not be translated into a reduction in poverty. In fact, he said, as a result of this growth, and the enthusiasm for it, domestic problems that were still very much present would be pushed into the background. Such problems included: social and political inequalities, a male-dominated society that openly disregarded women, and a high incidence of corruption. Notwithstanding these domestic factors, he was of the view that the ‘rising Indian star’ had great potential for cooperation on selected global issues such as the economic and financial crisis or nuclear proliferation. By contrast, the Indian government’s old-fashioned notion of the Westphalian state would prevent it from cooperating on issues such as climate-change.

**Dr. Sandra Destradi:**

**India’s Regional Politics and the Role of the Federal States**

The next panellist to speak was Dr Sandra Destradi of the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. Dr Destradi opened her presentation with observations on the political role of India in the South Asian region. A role as a major regional power was an important step on the road to becoming a great power with global aspirations, she said. India, however, was located in one of the most troubled regions of the world and there were indications that the country was not managing to achieve its regional goals. The Indian government, she said, was not able to stabilise the region and had no clear vision for leadership. It made few concessions to its neighbours and displayed a hegemonic tendency to pursue its own interests. In addition, neighbouring South Asian states feared domination by India and this was hindering the spread of Indian influence.

Dr Destradi pointed to a brief shift in Indian foreign policy from 2007 to 2009, with approaches being made to neighbouring states – in relation to trade, for example, or infrastructure. This short-lived trend had, however,
been reversed under pressure from domestic actors. In order to highlight the kind of influence which political actors at the sub-national, federal level exerted on foreign policy, Dr Destradi gave an example of the kind of policy-reversal in question. She described how the state of West Bengal had blocked a water-sharing agreement between the Indian government and West Bengal’s neighbour Bangladesh. The growing political impact of domestic policy-makers, she said, derived not only from local autonomy but also from the dependence of central government on local coalition partners.

Dr Destradi concluded with a series of open questions: Did the role played by the federal states represent a long-term trend in the democratisation process? What would its impact be? And would that impact extend beyond the region?

**Dr Mischa Hansel:**

**Elite Dissent on Foreign Policy**

The third panellist in Session 1, Dr Mischa Hansel of the University of Cologne, advanced the view, widely shared in the literature, of a broad foreign policy consensus among Indian elites back in the 1950s and 1960s. This idea had begun to wane in the period after 1990 –if not before. Dr Hansel explained the fragmentation among the elites in terms of two approaches: rational choice and constructivism.

The rational-choice view, he said, with its assumption about profit-maximising social actors, might point to changes in the elective incentives driving political parties and other actors to address foreign-policy issues. During elections, which were predominantly about domestic, or indeed local, issues, there was little interest in questions of foreign policy – although regional concerns could acquire importance in local or central elections and thus become politicised.

Moving on to the constructivist approach, Dr Hansel said that seen from this perspective, the various concepts of foreign policy outlined by Professor Wulf became ‘schools of thought’ competing in a ‘market of ideas’ that was subject to the uncertainty of the present day. Foreign policy thus became more dynamic, less static, as political elites became increasingly divided along the lines of these different schools of thought. Drawing additionally on role-theory, Dr Hansel described the differing roles and diverse normative commitments of political actors as an explanatory variable. It followed, he said, that inter-role conflicts were the reason for inconsistency and dissent in foreign policy.
Dr habil Christian Wagner:
‘Size Matters!’ – at Home as well as Abroad

The last panellist to speak in the first session, Dr habil Christian Wagner of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, approached his subject from two angles: the domestic structures influencing India’s global role, and the reasons why India and Indian foreign policy would prove to be a major force in the global politics of the future.

On the domestic front, Dr habil Wagner argued that India currently does not have the capacity to take part in global ‘power play’ or shape the world. Using the number of 700 diplomats (350 based in Delhi) for 200 states as a measuring indicator, it was hard to imagine that India had enough personnel capacity to represent Indian interests in international organisations and regimes and at the same time keep the domestic audience informed. Like previous panellists, Dr habil Wagner highlighted the growing importance of the Indian states. Whereas the former one-party system explained previous approaches to foreign policy, nowadays civil society was becoming increasingly important. As a result, mobilisation of the domestic audience had become crucial and political actors at the state level were gaining in influence. A further factor at play here was the weak role of the Indian parliament. All in all, concluded Dr habil Wagner, India faced a multitude of institutional problems at home.

Despite the challenges it faced in regard to domestic institutional capacities, said Dr habil Wagner, India did have an important role in global affairs – because ‘size matters’. There would today be no international regime without India; and while India would not meet all the Millennium Development Goals, its involvement was vital to ensure advances in poverty-reduction at the global level. In addition, the Indian middle classes were set to become a major global force in their capacity as consumers.

Summing up, Dr habil Wagner reckoned that India would play an important role in future but not as an active actor shaping the global order – or at least only shaping it to a limited extent. India would play by global rules but would still ‘want its place’. Despite this, it remained a reliable global partner.

Open Discussion on Session 1

Dr Siddharth Mallavarapu, Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, opened the discussion by questioning a number of the points made by Professor Wulf. The ‘idealist’ phase, he said, was actually one marked by the realism of Nehru. Modern influences did play a role in ‘hybridisation’, but the latter was dominated by right-wing policies and parties. And the ‘amorphous institutions’ were rather more problematic than would appear from Professor Wulf’s idealising depiction. Citing Dr habil Wagner, Dr Mallavarapu also stressed the role of
the middle class. Beyond economic reforms, he said, the middle class was hoping for a reform of the current system of corruption and was looking to the role of the middle class as played in other parts of the world.

Professor Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) at the Australian National University in Canberra, underlined the demographic importance of India. In 2040 more than half the global middle class will live in Asia, with most of the growth taking place in China and India. This situation raised questions not only about India’s future military, political, and economic power, but also about issues like economic reform and poverty-reduction. Professor Thakur saw a further domestic problem in the major divide between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations, with their differing aspirations, expectations, and demands. Concerning the breakdown of consensus among the Indian elites, as posited by Dr Hansel, Professor Thakur rejected the idea that there was any more dissent now than in Nehru’s time. Dissent (e.g. between political commentators) was only partial, he said, and there were common positions on important issues such as US–Indian relations. It was true that there was a lack of accord between civil society and the government, but for the present civil society had little clout in global politics.

Dr Aletta Mondré of the University of Duisburg Essen asked whether what India was lacking was actual vision (in foreign policy) or rather the institutions and capabilities to formulate such a vision and push ahead with it.

Dr Dieter Reinhardt of the Institute for Development and Peace broached the topic of Sino-Indian relations. It was his opinion that implementation of the ‘Look East’ policy, which was intended to provide India with a path to growth and enhance its strategic potential, was half-hearted. In addition, India was unable to deal with the problems – such as human-rights violations and military rule – prevailing in the Indian north-eastern states and as a result the economic and strategic corridor to South-East Asia was blocked.

In response to these remarks, Professor Wulf observed that there were no general statements that were not contestable. Although he believed the generation-problem was not as important as had been suggested, he planned to investigate it further. In relation to the Look East policy, he argued that it was not as unsuccessful as claimed by Dr Reinhardt: ASEAN cooperation was working well; relations with China were good on the economic front and the various difficulties in other spheres (the incidents in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, for example) had not prevented the two countries from cooperating.

Responding in her turn, Dr Destradi expressed the same sceptical view as Dr Reinhardt in regard to the Look East policy. Whilst acknowledging that there was still potential for progress in South and South-East Asia (as provided, for example, by the new dynamics resulting from the political changes in Myanmar), she underlined once again the serious differences
which India had with its neighbours. Attempting to draw together the arguments advanced by Dr Hansel and Professor Thakur as to whether there was consensus or dissent on foreign-policy issues in India, she pointed to the fact that there was no democratic contestation in this area. There was, rather, a debate amongst a small Delhi-based elite that comprised a number of important think-tanks but did not embrace the middle classes. And in that debate, there was one point on which all agreed — namely, you do not challenge established foreign policies. In response to the question raised by Dr Mondré, Dr Destradi suggested India was subject to a kind of self-censorship in which European ideas and recourse to ‘Western roots’ were eschewed, with the result that there was no ‘catchy’ foreign-policy concept or vision. This did not mean that there was a complete lack of strategy, but that the strategy remained hidden.

In this connection, Dr Hansel remarked that he did not know of any empirical studies regarding consensus in foreign policy and that if such a study were to be carried out, one would have to define and operationalize the term ‘consensus’ and ask whether the media, think-tanks, and other such entities were to be included in it.

Dr habil Wagner then returned to the subject of Sino-Indian relations and suggested that these were characterised by conflict (over borders), competition (over resources), and cooperation (in the fight against terror). The Look East policy, he said, had worked in terms of trade and trading partnerships: India exported more to China and East Asia than to any other region.

Session 2:

IBSA/BRICS as an Avenue to Changing Global Governance?

Session 2 of the workshop – ‘IBSA/BRICS as an Avenue to Changing Global Governance? – was chaired by Professor Lothar Brock, lecturer at the University of Frankfurt am Main and Senior Expert Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research. Professor Brock opened proceedings and handed over directly to Professor Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) at the Australian National University in Canberra.
Professor Ramesh Thakur: Importance of the BRICS Grouping and Shared Characteristics of Its Members

Echoing Goldman Sachs’s description of the BRICS circle, Professor Thakur described it as a ‘new and unique phenomenon’. It was, he said, an informal grouping with no common idea or vision of the future but with a set of shared interests. As a flexible and loose lobby-group, the five-country association represented a revisionist challenge to the global order. By 2040, estimated Thakur, the economic output of the BRICS grouping would be equal to that of the G7. The BRICS countries, he predicted, would use their emerging economies as ‘springboards’ enabling them to translate their economic weight into global policies. Although the BRICS nations were still short on joint initiatives, together they had global reach in diplomatic terms (more so than the other G20 states). Prof. Thakur mentioned that the rise of the BRICS is linked to the G7 and G8. Although they established with a lack of capacities, BRICS challenged the status quo with highly indebted industrial countries and an unjust system of financial institutions. A readjustment – a reform within the G8 – was therefore needed, as called for at the Heiligendamm meeting.

Shared Interests and the ‘Search for Cement’ within BRICS

Professor Thakur then turned his attention to the major shared interests of the five BRICS countries in relation to global economic governance. All five, he said, adhered to a neo-Westphalian notion of governance, including a traditional understanding of state sovereignty and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. They were, again, all interested in the transfer of technology from North to South, along ‘no village left behind’ lines. And finally, they all displayed an understanding of a rule-based world-order in which differing political systems are respected.

Notwithstanding these common elements – and the solidarity conferred by membership of the BRICS club – the BRICS countries, said Professor Thakur, were still ‘in search of their cement’. Thus they remained rivals on the question of resources and energy, and they engaged in border-related conflicts with one another. Again, the three democracies in the BRICS grouping necessarily differed from the autocracies in their mode of governance. And whereas Russia and China were permanent members of the UN Security Council, the other emerging powers were merely aspirants to this status. There was also continuing dissension over currency and exchange policies. And, finally, each of the countries in BRICS differed in its relations and ties with the North. It might be, said Professor Thakur, that the dominant geo-political relationship would no longer be that between China and the US but that between China and India. Despite the differences described, said Professor Thakur, there was
evidence that the BRICS countries did in fact act as a bloc in international settings.

In conclusion, Professor Thakur argued that the BRICS countries would prove unable to fulfil their ambitions vis-à-vis the decline of the West. As things stood, he said, they did not have the capacity to restructure the status quo. In order to be able to do so, the five member-countries needed to see diversity and difference as a virtue, or engage in some kind of identity-building to establish greater commonality.

**Dr Silke Weinlich:**

**India’s Difficulties in Finding an Appropriate Role in the UN**

Dr Silke Weinlich, Head of the ‘(Im)possibility of Cooperation’ research unit at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research began her presentation with a critical appraisal of the relevance of BRICS and IBSA for India. Both clubs were beneficial, said Dr Weinlich, and served as forums for information-exchange, learning, coordination, and advocacy. From this point of view, the BRICS and IBSA groupings could be considered complementary to existing global-governance structures. So far, said Dr Weinlich, there had been very few serious attempts to create alternative global-governance structures of a kind that might challenge the current world-order. She cited the planned BRICS Bank as evidence of this. The BRICS countries had decided to set this up as an alternative to the World Bank but were having trouble defining its actual, positive characteristics. There continued to be differences over the bank’s location, the modes of contribution to it, and, more generally, its lending-model and strategic direction.

Dr Weinlich then addressed the question of Indian aspirations at the United Nations. She felt India was still looking for a new role within the UN system – one that corresponded more closely with its enhanced status in the international system and its role as a provider of development assistance. On the one hand, she said, India was demanding a greater say in UN bodies such as the Security Council and IMF and was advocating a stronger role for South–South cooperation in the UN. On the other hand, it remained a net beneficiary of UN development-assistance and was rather cautious in its behaviour in the General Assembly and other governing bodies of the UN, avoiding either openly aligning itself with the industrial countries or demanding a leadership-role. It made a point of acting in concert with the Group of 77 although the interests it shared with poorer and smaller developing countries were arguably diminishing.

Dr Weinlich concluded that in the short term India would continue with its ambivalent role. It shied away, she said, from assuming a more prominent leadership-role that would bring with it serious political – and possibly also economic – costs. The North–South divide that exerted such a formative force on all UN processes was a further hurdle in its search for a new role.
**Philipp Rotmann:**
**BRICS and IBSA as Temporary Forms of Governance in the Current ‘State of Flux’**

The third panellist in Session 2, Philipp Rotmann of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), took a sceptical view of the clubs currently being formed by the emerging economies. He saw BRICS and IBSA more as lobby-groups than as projects aimed at bringing about a revision of the present global structure. He preferred to see BRICS and IBSA as catalysts to global change rather than as manifestations of such change or proofs of multilateralism. He also expressed doubts about the idea of using BRICS and IBSA as templates – for other developing countries, for example. He saw the current world-order as being in a ‘state of flux’ and was doubtful as to how long temporary structures would persist after this period of transition. As a result, he would not bet too heavily on BRICS in the longer term. Like Dr Weinlich, he saw it as a supporting element in the global system.

All forums go parallel and not superior to each other, said Rotmann, and bilateral relations continued to be important for cooperation. All the players were experimenting, he said, and this made it impossible to tell which approach was prevailing or would prevail in future. Another important factor in the transition-phase was the problem both clubs faced in regard to legitimacy, given that the state system represented governments rather than people (notably the growing middle class). He was not sure, he said, that this type of government and elite-driven governance could be a model for the future.

Rotmann concluded that BRICS is not the harbinger of global system fragmentation. In fact, the countries are deeply embedded in today’s global system such as the (western shaped) global market.

**Professor Meibo Huang:**
**Opportunities and Limits of South–South Cooperation among BRICS Countries**

Maibo Huang, Professor at Xiam University, Director of the China Institute for International Development (CIID), and currently Senior Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, was the last panellist to speak at the workshop. She began by endorsing Dr habil Wagner’s argument that size mattered and identified this feature – of which population was one indicator – as the reason for the importance of the BRICS grouping. Despite its economic weight, she said, BRICS still suffered from a lack of competitiveness.

Notwithstanding the five summits held to date, growth in cooperation amongst the BRICS countries was slow, said Professor Huang. Nevertheless BRICS appeared to offer a viable alternative to other global
clubs. In 2005/2006, she recalled, China had intended to join the G8 as a developing country but withdrew because of common interests, shared by the BRICS. This indicated that South–South relations were set to become even more important than they were today and demonstrated the increasing power of the emerging countries.

On the other hand, said Professor Huang, South–South cooperation was hampered by domestic limits on capacities and resources. The BRICS countries were prevented from exploiting their full potential (such as that deriving from their size) by the characteristic problems they suffered as developing countries. South–South cooperation was also hindered by a lack of mutual trust and understanding. Like Professor Thakur, Professor Huang pointed to the differing ties and relations which all the BRICS countries had with each other and with the Western world.

In a sobering concluding observation, Professor Huang limited BRICS enthusiasm and reminded that the club had so far not been able to establish not one single formal institution. She also questioned BRICS’s over-ambitious agenda, given the scarcity of its capacities and resources.

Open Discussion on Session 2

Dr Rainer Baumann, Head of the ‘Global Governance Revisited’ research unit at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, highlighted the informal nature of the ‘club model’ exemplified in the G8, BRICS, and IBSA. He identified a shift away from strict, highly formalised institutionalism (demonstrated by the crisis of the EU) to an ad hoc form of governance in which decisions were looser. He asked whether this might prove an advantage and whether it might be a dominant feature of global governance in the future.

Dr habil Wagner echoed Philip Rottman’s scepticism about the template-function of BRICS and asked who might follow in its footsteps. Apart from the serious problem of legitimacy, he said, there was the critical question of whether the BRICS grouping could act as a force that would attract other countries or whether these countries would continue to pursue their own interests. Dr Mondré responded by saying that BRICS countries were seen as representatives of the South and it was therefore easy for them to persuade other Southern countries on board. In this connection, Professor Wulf argued that the ‘BRICS’ acronym was a misleading one: the combination of countries was, as it were, random, and they were not as homogeneous as assumed. This meant, he said, that other emerging countries could be added.

Referring to the problem of legitimacy, Professor Thakur contrasted the G8 and BRICS grouping with the UN system, in which, he said, permanent members of the Security Council were equally lacking in legitimacy, given that there was a vast section of the global population that they did not represent. Leaving this factor aside, the UN system, he thought, was the global context with the most legitimacy. On the other hand, he wondered
whether there was a sufficient sense of a world community that might be represented by the UN. The G20, he concluded, might provide a solution to both these problems: as a ‘club’, its size rendered it efficient and able to strike a deal; it had a certain sense of collectiveness; and it commanded greater legitimacy than the other clubs because it represented a large tranche of the global population. Professor Thakur also raised the question of whether the BRICS are conceived as site or as an actor. As a site the BRICS would be an expression of the traditional foreign policy, while as an actor they would have to represent all five countries. Professor Thakur estimated that because the five countries are so driven by particular interests, they couldn’t build a normative vision as an actor to attract others.

Concluding remarks by Professor Lothar Brock

Bringing the workshop to a close, Professor Brock observed that the participants had been addressing something that wasn’t really there and that simply by talking about ‘BRICS’ they had already constructed a reality. Summing up the role of the BRICS grouping, he cited Professor Thakur’s remark to the effect that the BRICS countries were currently not strong enough to make up for the decline of the West. He wondered whether they would be able to build up the necessary capacities to do this and what it would mean (in terms of values) if they did manage to fill the gap. In this connection, he commented that size mattered but that policies mattered too. And even when it came to size, one had to break the situation down – as indicated by Professor Wulf and the uncertainties about future Indian capacities. It might be, said Professor Brock, that the ‘new gap-filler’ would turn out to be not very different – or indeed regressive. As evidence for this, he cited the arguments advanced by Professor Thakur and his observation about the concept of the Westphalian state being common to all members of the BRICS group. Professor Brock inquired if that could have an emancipatory aspect of a neo-Westphalian order in contrast to the western hegemony. He therefore concluded with the question whether the BRICS as such are something emancipatory ‘or more or less the same’.

Report by Jan Schablitzki