Workshop Documentation „Global Governance revisited”

“Normative-Cultural Claims and Problems of Legitimacy in International Negotiation Arenas”

Workshop in Preparation of the Launch of
The Käte Hamburger Kolleg
“Political Cultures of World Society”
Center for Global Cooperation Research
A Cooperative Project of DIE, INEF and KWI

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1 Introduction:

1.1 The Käte Hamburger Kolleg:

A great success for the North Rhine-Westphalian research community is the impending Opening of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg “Political Cultures of World Society” a Centre for Global Cooperation Research. An international panel of experts recommended to the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) to set up the Centre for a period of six years. The Kolleg harks back to an initiative of the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, KWI) in Essen and will start work in Duisburg in February 2012. Also involved in the project are the German Development Institute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) and, for the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE), the Institute for Development and Peace (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEF).

The International Kolleg will focus on the possibility and potentials of global cooperation. As an intellectual laboratory, its aim is to explore plausible designs for a culturally diversified world society and a global policy shaken by multiple crises and struggling for legitimacy. The Centre will be different from current approaches in four main respects:

- first, in its interdisciplinary approach to understand cooperation among individuals, cultures, states and societies,
- second, in its strong basis in regional research and in the theory of democracy,
- third, in its wide horizon in terms of the history and comparison of cultures; and
- fourth, the sectoral expertise will be honed in on current decision-making processes.

The Centre will be headed by Tobias Debiel (INEF/UDE), Claus Leggewie (KWI) and Dirk Messner (DIE). Divided into four clusters, researchers and internationally renowned fellows will introduce research perspectives from a wide range of disciplines – from the social and natural sciences and the study of civilisation and from the fields of policy-making, advocacy and consultancy. The fellows will develop interdisciplinary processes of discussion and research. They will identify and analyse the obstacles to and opportunities for global cooperation and the normative foundations of a culturally diversified world society, particularly with regards to selected fields of global governance (such as climate change, state sovereignty and intervention).

In preparation for the launch of the Centre, DIE, INEF and KWI are organizing a series of workshops. These are kindly supported by UDE’s Core Research Area (Profilschwerpunkt) on the “Transformation of Contemporary Societies” which focuses on emerging orders in the globalized world of the 21st century.

The workshops aim to discuss selected parts of the Centre’s research agenda with internationally reputed experts as well as with colleagues from the three institutes, from the UDE and other partners.

1.2 The Third Workshop: “Global Governance revisited”

Negotiation processes on an international level are characterized by a range of normative claims, which actors sometimes tend to attribute to “cultural differences”. In these cases, very often “cultural differences” serve to justify why certain norms are looked upon as being appropriate,
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others as being inappropriate and therefore not acceptable to one’s society. Well-known cases are women’s rights or activities of international organizations related to family planning.

But what makes differences “cultural” and what lies at the root of “cultural differences”? Do “cultural differences” always have a negative impact on the prospect of striking an agreement on the issues under discussion? Or can “cultural differences” be used as creative resource for problem-solving on the global level? If yes, under what circumstances would this be feasible?

Culture as a theoretical concept relates to different attitudes, values or habits and lifestyles by which certain groups are characterized and which is part of a distinct identity of the group and its members. From a sociological perspective, culture can become an important factor in explaining the behavior of a group or an individual whenever certain actions rely on cultural determinants as guiding principles (implicitly or explicitly).

The third and last workshop in the series of preparatory workshops for the Käte Hamburger Kolleg aims to discuss these questions with reputable researchers and practitioners from the field. The first day focuses on global governance and its pluri-cultural negotiation arenas. The second day of the workshop is devoted to different concepts of “democracy” and “legitimacy” on a global level. How and in what way can democratic standards of legitimacy and accountability be applied? How can they contribute to the achievement of “global justice”?

### 2 Cooperation in Pluri-Cultural Negotiation Arenas

#### 2.1 Taking Stock – Experiences from Pluri-Cultural Negotiation Arenas

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<th>Opening Roundtable</th>
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<td><strong>Prof. Dr. Inge Kaul</strong>, Adjunct Professor at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin</td>
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<td><strong>Dr. Laurie Nathan</strong>, Director of the Centre for Mediation at the University of Pretoria</td>
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<td><strong>Prof. Dr. Herbert Wulf</strong>, Adjunct Senior Researcher at the INEF</td>
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<td><strong>Moderation: Jens Martens</strong>, Director of the European Office of Global Policy Forum (GPF)</td>
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This opening roundtable, moderated by Jens Martens, started with three introductory statements of the roundtable participants, who were asked to elaborate on the influence of what they look upon as “cultural determinants” of negotiation processes from their long-standing experiences in international settings.

The three main questions of the roundtable were:

1. Do cultural aspects or determinants have a significant influence in international negotiation arenas?
2. Is there something like “cultural diversity” in place?
3. Are there useful ways to deal with cultural obstacles, to overcome them and to make use of their positive aspects?
2.1.1 Inge Kaul: “culture matters”

Inge Kaul argued that culture matters. She reported from her experiences in Asia that first of all people look at each other as human beings by asking questions about their wellbeing and family before starting the business. She also recognized another sense for time in this region of the world so that she concludes that the socio-cultural context of negotiations is important.

In bilateral conversations, Inge Kaul never experienced restriction by culture, so that she assumes that the direct relation to the counterpart is essential for the negotiation. The conditions are respect, the preparedness to listen to the counterpart and openness to for different perspectives.

In opposition to this, culture plays a role at the level of multilateral negotiations. Here she observed the domination of western style of communication, which she describes as top-down, conditional and with strict time slots in contradiction to communication types of other parts of the world, where she founds a more reflexive and responsive style of governance. It is in fact the western style of communication which also sets the priority matters of today’s international negotiations so that according to Inge Kaul culture does not only shape the negotiation style but also the agenda of negotiations. In this context she pointed at the gender problem in international negotiations which goes hand in hand with the competition of power as male from western industrial countries dominate most negotiations by demonstrating their power.

Furthermore she listed the different types of professional cultures such as the culture of bureaucrats and the culture of maintaining things or organizations.

One of her suggestions for the future research agenda of the Kolleg was to look more deeply at the roles and characters of representatives of cultures to find out which type of representative acts in what way or if there are any differences in roles of representatives at all. Another research area could be in the field of a common culture of international negotiations which she sees as lacking at the moment. One could think of a combination of ethics/fairness and efficiency of international negotiations as Udo di Fabio advocates for. Finally she postulated for a culture of policy entrepreneurship in order to achieve more sustainability.

2.1.2 Laurie Nathan: “culture in wars”

Laurie Nathan focused in his statement at “culture in wars” and referred explicitly at the Darfur Conflict. He presented four different aspects of the Darfur conflict, in which culture played a role and categorized two of them as substantive and the other two as procedural aspects.

Beginning with the substantive role of culture, Laurie Nathan explained that in Darfur the rebellion took place between an African identity of the south and an Arab identity of the north. Hence, when the war began in 1983, culture was one of its direct causes. For the resolution of a conflict it is important to find the right balance between recognizing as well as protecting ethnicity and avoiding the fetisation of ethnicity. So on the one hand culture can be a cause or a causal element of conflict (1) and on the other hand culture can be a polarizing factor and a hindrance for the resolution of a conflict (2).

Laurie Nathan then elaborated the difficulties which took place during the negotiation processes, which were challenged by the different negotiation partners. First of all, the negotiators of the governmental side were well educated civil servants who came together with mostly under-educated and unconfident rebels. The government’s sense of superiority leads to a blockade by the rebels with no progress in negotiation. So the inequality of the negotiation partners can be an impediment of
successful negotiation as well (3). Another impediment of successful negotiations is that international actors neglect the cultural factors (4). In the Darfur conflict a mismatch in selecting the mediators occurred as none of them spoke Arabic although this was the negotiation language. In result, no trust neither confidence could be built up. Most of the international mediators share the assumption that their approach is natural, universal and free from culture whereas Laurie Nathan made the experience that most of the approaches are strictly formal, rigid and gender-inflexible.

He concluded that the issue of culture is fascinating and troubling at the same time. The partial blindness of negotiation approaches of other countries inhibits progress in negotiations. The challenge for the Kolleg will be to overcome these misconceptions for example by dialogue of people from different cultures.

### 2.1.3 Herbert Wulf: “international arm regulations”

Herbert Wulf concentrated on the regulation on arms trade at the global level. Drawing parallels between the case of Libya, where many European arms companies made arms deals as soon as the arms embargo was lifted in 2003, and the case of the arming of Saddam Hussein two decades earlier, he outlined that this had led to the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the aim of which was to get early warning signals such as the accumulation of weapons by a specific country.

Four approaches to get arms under control can be distinguished:

- disarmament,
- arms control,
- export restrictions and
- a cooperative security initiative at the UN level.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in 1991 can be seen as the attempt to set up an international regime, supported by Japan and some European countries, but opposed by many others.

As the case of Libya shows, the UN Register of Conventional Arms is at least a partial failure. However, Herbert Wulf did not only attribute this failure to cultural divergences between UN countries, but also to several other factors: Firstly, while the register shall bring transparency, arms trades normally take place in silence. Secondly, other political agendas may play a role. Thirdly, on the recipient side, there is the primacy of military security - on the supplier side, the primacy of economics. Professional divergences between government negotiators and researchers for example, or between generals and diplomats, play a role rather than cultural divergences (generals do understand generals from other cultures quite well, and probably better than researchers from their own culture).

This led Herbert Wulf to the conclusion that cultural aspects are emphasized in negotiations in order to hide other political and economic interests. In the case of the arms deals, the desire to sell (or to buy) weapons is such a powerful interest that cultural divergences are easily pushed into the background.
2.1.4 Plenary Discussion

The participants shared the common view that culture is a very complex phenomenon which is difficult to define. It can be defined in very different ways and from different viewpoints. One should differentiate between “culture” and “ethnicity” as well as try to define different “types of culture” rather than “culture” in general.

Although cultural diversity seems to be a fact in communication processes it can have more or less meaning in diverse negotiation settings. In two-party conflicts, such as the Darfur conflict showed, culture played a significant role and has to be considered carefully by external mediators.

In international negotiations Inge Kaul misses a common culture for all participants as can be fined in the economic markets where states appear as private actors and share the culture of a “fair deal” for example. The notions for international political negotiations could be fairness, justice and respect.

It was also discussed not to use culture as the only explanatory factor for failures in international negotiations as this could lead to a simplification of very complex issues. Instead, existing theories such as the incentive theory or behavioral economics can help to explain the processes in very meaningful ways.
2.2 The Architecture of Global Governance and Cooperation in Pluri-Cultural Negotiation Arenas

2.2.1 Post-Colonial Perspectives on the Architecture of Global Governance

Shalini Randeria devotes her current work to India and here on the She works on the phenomenon of impoverishment and its relation to new enclosures in economic zones. She argues that the phenomenon is not about poverty as a state but about “impoverishment” as a process. In the capitalist state, it is perfectly legitimate to render some people “poor”. The state is getting transnationalized, in a way privatized and unaccountable to its citizens. So, the question is to whom the state is accountable? Claims are passed around, so that nobody is accountable for the damage. In result, a disclaiming of responsibility can be observed.

When it comes to “the politics of the poor”, Shalini Randeria recognizes two phenomena:

1) More and more soft law comes into consideration: Citizens cannot hold governments accountable, but the administration. So there is a gentle depoliticization going on.
2) A politicization of the judiciary takes place.

How and where the state appears and disappears seems to be an obvious tactic “cunning states”.

With regard to Global Governance, Shalini Randeria demands for a rethinking of the North-South-story. She states that the entire architecture of Global Governance is a post-colonial one. The former colonies had nothing to say when the rules were laid down. One should stop thinking about the Global South as “lacking behind”. Today, for example Ecuador is supporting France with his debt problems with the International Monetary Fund. She calls for a re-configuration of geographical ties.

Shalini Randeria also recognizes changes and contradictions in the development arena. In the past developed countries saw the informal labor in developing countries as one of its main problems, whereas nowadays “informalization” of labor has become a fashion.
Aram Ziai asked how the architecture of Global Governance can be analyzed from the perspective of post-colonialism.

He pointed at three periods of North-South-relations:

1) The era of “colonialism” led to a dualism and was about civilizing the uncivilized.
2) The era of “development” led to a universalist dualism and was about developing the underdeveloped.
3) The era of “Global Governance” led to a universalism and was/is about shaping globalization in the common interest.

So, can Global Governance be seen as continued imperialism? The promise of “development” was superseded by the promise of a democratic and equal governance of the world. Its function was to secure acceptance of the current unequal world order by promising a more just one. It stresses democracy and ownership, but it ensures that free decisions in the South remain within certain limits. Third World countries remain as “others” with fewer rights. This is mirrored in PRSPs, budget support programs, the WTO, the NPT, in democratization and climate policy.

Suggestions for improving the global governance architecture often imply a benevolent and omnipotent actor, abstracting from real relations of power. Thus Aram Ziai proposes to overcome the methodological nationalism in political science, international relations and questions of democracy. Furthermore, he pleads for an acknowledgement if conflicts instead of formulating the common interests and propose strategic action for concrete actors.

It was mostly agreed that the problems on international level are structural and not cultural. Social movements for example are somehow bypassing the state and putting it under pressure via international organizations. The need for a shifting in alliances was underlined as there are some states and some NGOs but not one type of actor we can rely on. The hierarchal structure of
international negotiations was discussed controversially. For some hierarchies are cross-cutting and the hierarchy of a country is only one of many types whereas for others the dominance of the North is still evident as can be seen on the few southern research contributions on issues such as the European Union social policies. The anthropological contribution to discussions about dualism such as “North-South” or “Strong-Weak” can help to overcome these differences as anthropology focuses on the “local” level in contradiction to the political sciences which is based on nation states and therefore needs scaling. New normative agendas could occur with Chinas role in the international arena as China behaves more agnostic and pragmatic. But at the same time it was mentioned that this observation is not based on facts and that it is unclear if China acts because of a feeling of equality or extensive superiority.

2.2.2 Culture and Negotiations

The presentation held by Gunnar Sjöstedt dealt with the dynamic relationship between professional cultures and negotiations, such as the impact culture may have on the outcome of an encounter of actors involved in the same situation or interaction.

According to Gunnar Sjöstedt, the cognitive dimension of culture is important, since culture influences the behaviour of people; it provides them access to a “culturally-coded toolkit”. Since there are different types of culture (e.g. professional culture, national culture) there may be different types of research questions. It would be important to define “interest” as the forming of interests is influenced by culture. What determines the outcome is the interaction of decisive elements of culture and negotiation determines. In a holistic approach to „culture“, the focus lays on values, beliefs, practices and so on. The “negotiation” concept includes elements like structure, issues, actors (their strategies), processes, and outcome.

Professional harmony can be established in cases where the professional cultures use a common frame of reference. According to Gunnar Sjöstedt this makes cultural encounters in negotiations
more likely to be successful. But the matching of different professional cultures can, at the same time, represent a bad match for example when scientists and diplomats come together. These situations can have operational implications for negotiations as visible in the risk assessment in environmental problems.

Possible research areas for the future agenda of the Kolleg could be among others:

- Not-culturally free environments of international negotiation arenas
- The question why agreements come into being despite the cultural differences
- What are potential facilitators in negotiations (what can bring parties together, questions of legitimacy, reframing of existing questions, change of negotiation settings, etc.)
- To what extent does culture matter under which circumstances.

Coming to the research designs qualitative comparative case studies were proposed as a way to distinguish successful from unsuccessful negotiations and to explore decisive factors and lessons learned. Randomized experiments could be another possibility for testing the independent variable, but one has to take into account the scaling-up problem of such experiments in these complex settings. Nevertheless, experiments could be used as an additional method of research. Process-tracing is one way to find out more about the settings, actors, structures, and the process of negotiations with participants with different cultural backgrounds. Experiments with computer games could be used – they could be played by people with different cultural backgrounds.

### 2.2.3 World Order and World Religions

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<th>Working Group 3</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Input:</strong> Prof. Dr. Rainer Tetzlaff, Wisdom Professor of African and Development Studies, Jacobs University Bremen</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comment:</strong> Prof. Dr. Claus Leggewie, Director of the KWI, Essen</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moderation:</strong> PD. Dr. Jochen Hippler, Senior Researcher, INEF</td>
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Regarding the impact of religion on world order, Rainer Tetzlaff said religious actions have and will always influence politics. Religion is essential to war and peace, and in many cases, religion is abused as a means of repression. Currently, Islamist parties gain more and more support in the North African countries, a fact which Rainer Tetzlaff traced back to the failure of modernization. The disappointment of urban middle classes is used to politicize Islam and Islamic culture as being against modernization, globalization, and secularization.

Culture, Rainer Tetzlaff continued, is context-dependent, it influences the decisions of people and how they conceive their interests. Since globalization tends to increase socio-economic imbalances within societies, this has a disembedding effect, and religion becomes more attractive to people.
Especially in failed states, religion can give people orientation. The question is how religious conflicts can be handled.

Concerning contexts of multicultural societies, Rainer Tetzlaff outlined that migrants ‘relearn’ their religion in the context of migration, in distance from their country of origin. Confrontation between cultures should be turned into cultural interpenetration (“Anverwandlung”). In modern societies, cultural translations are needed. For example, Islamic peace judges can be used to work supplementary to normal courts. A public sphere inclusive of cultural differences is needed. Furthermore, it is important to explore how public culture underpins politics. In Rainer Tetzlaff’s view, multicultural societies need alternative public spaces, even counter-public spaces, as the precondition for recognizing cultural differences.

Commenting on the surprising event of two religious parties winning the elections in Egypt, Claus Leggewie said that democratization leads and will lead to a stronger role of religion in politics – not in Europe, but in the rest of the world.

The field of international relations, he continued, has been very reluctant to take into account the role of religion in world politics. There have always been reductionist tendencies which regarded religion merely as the dependent factor, overlooking that it may also be the independent factor. Claus Leggewie stressed that there is an intrinsic ambiguity between religion and the political sphere. Empirical trends since the 1970s showed that,

1) the number of conflicts which have at least a religious side is increasing
2) that new conflicts are started because of religion
3) that the intensity of conflicts is much higher when religion is plays a role.
When state order breaks down, religious conflicts or civil wars based on religious identities are increased. On the other hand, religion can also contribute to peace: religious movements for peace have played an important role in ending conflicts, e.g. the German peace movement, but also international examples such as the San Egidio case.

Touching upon the issue of secularization, Claus Leggewie pointed out that Europe has experienced a very different development from the rest of the world, with the “French way” of complete separation of religion and state order. The US version of secularization which allows the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere may be a model for non-European countries, rather than the French way. Religious practice is decreasing in Europe, whereas religiosity, e.g. in the form of faith-based organization, is actually increasing in the US.

While religious groups play an important role in Nigeria, they do not in Ivory Coast. What makes the difference? Claus Leggewie identified two different trends: Firstly, that of religious globalization: There are two complementary cases, the trend of secularization (e.g. in China) and that of sacralization, the emergence of fundamentalism, theocratic entities. Secondly, there is the tendency of closing, leading to intolerance, segregation, and competition. In his view, it is not yet clear in which direction things will develop.

Taking up the issue of the relation between increasing importance of religion and secularization, Jochen Hippler said that it was not necessarily antagonistic.

He continued, identifying three approaches to religion:

1) The secular approach which understands religion as accumulated tradition, and culture as made by human beings in society
2) The individualistic approach, focusing on the relation of an individual to god
3) Religion as a value. Here, the differentiation between religion and religiosity may also be helpful.

He stressed that religion should not be confused with tradition. This blurring of boundaries is generally exploited by fundamentalists. Islamism, he continued, is not necessarily fundamentalism, since it is often driven by reform-mindedness. The role of ideology in politics, Jochen Hippler concluded, should be looked into: Can religion be seen as a subset under ideology?

The participants discussed the use of religion by different actors in conflict areas and also by western media. Two trends were observed: on the hand the increase in conflicts related to religion and on the other hand the positive influence of religious values for peace. Yet, it is not clear in which direction the development will move.

Discussing fundamentalist terrorism, Jochen Hippler wondered whether it may be one phenomenon, which differs in shape, referring to the Norwegian Anders Breivik, the new German terror group Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, or terrorism in Egypt. The common ground for all terrorists, Claus Leggewie said, was their paranoia.
2.3 Plenary Discussion

Tobias Debiel stated at the beginning that it has not been talked much about religion at the international level or in international negotiation arenas. The first year of the Kolleg will offer space to deal with the “state of the art” in these issues. Questions such as “How do “culture” and “religious movements” impact on the international arena and establish factors of international accountability” will be addressed as well as the exploration of functioning research designs.

However, the use of the term “culture” was discussed controversially. Shalini Randeria pointed at four main problems with the concept “culture” from an anthropologist view:

1) “Culture” is an holistic concept
2) The concept lacks a sense of historicity: How long has something to endure to be called “culture”? Terms of self-description like “Hindu” are only 150 years old. “Culture” as a source or as a toolkit can be resembled. So, there is nothing enduring in it
3) If “culture” is an explanation category, what then does it explain?
4) “Culture” is a highly political term to express racism.

She stated that India has always been a multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. But the notion of “culture” imposes homogeneity. One should rather identify the underlying reasons for people to use the term: Who uses culture, when and in order to do what? Culture, Shalini Randeria added, is an “enigma word”, a useful category to understand what people say about themselves to ask than what they use it for.

Others argued for a pragmatic use of the term as it is commonly known, whether there are existing precise definitions or not. The study of culture is the study of political misunderstandings between human beings. Different languages, age groups, gender etc. produce different kinds of culture, but they refer to certain aspects to produce common identity. According to Claus Leggewie, the term should not be defined too narrowly. “Culture” refers to a symbolic arena of human communication. “Culture” is a subject, not an entity. He claimed that all theories of cooperation - be they cognitive, instrumental or humanitarian - will fail if they leave out “culture”. Groups refer to identities. Those can be organizational, gender-related et cetera. “Culture” will change and one can play with it.

It was agreed on the need of a certain kind of category for the construction of meanings and shared social beliefs, something which is not covered by politics and economy. Laurie Nathan acknowledged that the concept of culture was elusive, ambiguous and elastic. Nevertheless, he fined it a useful category for research and illustrated his argument with the example of the ANC in South Africa. There may be no South African culture of negotiation but the ANC does have a specific culture of negotiation. It seems of interest to examine whether differences did inhibit or facilitate the negotiations.

In this context the visibility of a common “culture” on a more aggregate level was underlined. In bigger groups people share more than in smaller groups, where people see themselves more as individuals. So the questions would be how one can move from the individual to the collective level, when the shared elements become “collective” and how and why something is accepted as “culture”.

Turning to “professional” and “organizational culture”, the participants agreed that an “organizational culture” does exist. According to Gunnar Sjöstedt people share attitudes; values etc.
3 Creating and Ensuring Democratic Standards of Legitimacy and Accountability in Pluri-Cultural Negotiation Arenas

Debate

Prof. Dr. Flemming Christiansen, Professor of Society and Politics in East Asia, UDE
Prof. Dr. Jan-Aart Scholte, Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick
Moderation: Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel, Director of INEF and Professor of International Relations at the UDE

3.1 The Concept of Democratic Legitimacy in Global Governance from an East Asian Perspective

Flemming Christiansen observes diverse historical trajectories in East Asia, what makes it difficult to sum up China, Japan, et cetera “regionally”. So, the focus of Flemming Christiansen’s input is based on China as a main flashpoint in global debates as China is the important issue when it comes to international cooperation. From a Chinese perspective, China is a democracy. In this regard, two main aspects are worth consideration:

1. China is a people’s democracy. This term is not worth the trouble. Instead, we have got to find out, what is in it. China is a people’s dictatorship as well. Its democratic centralism is a tool for getting people engaged and involved in the political decision-making process. It is a functional procedure. Even if one might like to call China “authoritarian” it is worth to analyze how people think to make rightful decisions in China.

2. China’s foreign policy is strongly shaped by the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the basic concept to conduct policy on and is about the integrity of the Chinese state. This can partly be explained by the fact that after 1911, American-trained Chinese diplomats became the main actors in Chinese foreign affairs. The Westphalian model of the state is an extremely important legacy from that time. Because of its history of foreign occupation, the integrity of Chinese territory is extremely important, as the disputes around the South China Sea, or the issues of Tibet or Taiwan show.

From a Chinese perspective, a new political, economic and social order should contain the following aspects:

1. A new concept of International Relations with mutual respect of sovereignty,
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2. A new concept of stability, as the new order is changing from a unipolar to a multipolar system,
3. A new concept of development which is made upon win-win approaches,
4. A new concept of civilization which has to be harmonious – here, the goal is the coexistence of civilizations, within the framework of the harmonious society.

Flemming Christiansen argued that a reform of the UN should help to implement these changes and maintain the diversity of the World.

3.2 The Limits of “Democratizing” Global Governance

Jan-Aart Scholte addressed the *challenges* of democratizing Global Governance. Since Global Governance relates to the global public and thus affects people all over the world, in his opinion first of all the discussion about the democratization of Global Governance should be democratic as well. If research settings did enable truly democratic discussions including researchers and practitioners alike, and people from all world regions, results would be slightly different, he said.

In his opinion, democratizing Global Governance is desirable for various reasons: democracy has an intrinsic value; democracy as a core value promotes other core values; and democracy can underpin the legitimacy of governments. Jan-Aart Scholte presented three models of democratizing global affairs: Statism, modern cosmopolitanism and post-modern global democracies.

First, in a *statist* view, one should democratize the states to achieve democratic nation states all over the world, which would lead to a state-based global democracy. But Jan-Aart Scholte sees limits to this view: Even if there were democratic nation-states all over the world, bringing democracy from the national level to the global level would not work. Since states are not held accountable at a global level, the behaviour of states in the global system is not very democratic, and holding national referenda on global affairs would not be a viable option. Furthermore, there is a fundamental mismatch between the entity of the state and Global Governance. While global problems are not defined territorially, states are. Governance does take place through non-state channels, so it would not be enough to democratize the states. The people affected by global problems are often not represented at the national level.

Secondly, in a *modern cosmopolitan* view, the strategy is to globalize core principles like human rights, the civil society et cetera. This view is a better approach, but it likewise comes along with problems: We try to globalize the kind of democracy and political culture we know, but maybe this is not the way to do democracy for global demoses. Furthermore, we tend to speak of “humanity” as a whole and forget that this is nothing to be “taken for granted” as there is no such thing as a global “same interest”. The global demos has divisions and conflicts along different lines. The approach also tends to alleviate “only” poverty but for democratic participation the global gini-coefficients is more important.

The *post-modern global democracies* view tries to offer an alternative to go beyond the limits of both statism and modern cosmopolitanism, by avoiding the state-centric and the globalist tendencies, and to put solidarity on the fore to bring the question of distribution on the agenda.
3.3 Plenary Discussion

In the discussion China’s view on sovereignty was highlighted as from a Chinese point of view small countries do not have a foreign policy. So the issue of superiority plays an important role in international negotiations. Furthermore, Chinese nationalism is growing and thus influencing policymaking. At the same time, Flemming Christiansen added, that China is increasingly internalizing global norms and values but only those which are favorable to its own development, not those detrimental to China’s growth. The question which arose from this context was how it would be possible to get China on the negotiation table and discuss common or universal values instead of internalizing norms on an instrumental level. It was agreed on the necessity of legitimacy for Global Governance to be sustainable as well as a consensus on rules and procedures. Moreover, a conflict- and value-free forum was desired.

Interactions between China and the world should be considered from a historical perspective. Otherwise, a dysfunctional outside view on China would narrow the options. Foreign media for example is not really representative for the whole Chinese society. One should not just look at the middle-classes and forget the people working in sweatshops, the huge migrant population and the excluded from modern social frameworks. In respect of this, a Political Economy view often clearly shows us what is going on.

Jan-Aart Scholte explained that the issue of a global civil society is a difficult one since one has to look closely to see what voices come through. Western dominant media give voice to certain people and not to others. He said he regarded “human rights”, for example, as a cultural historical baggage which leads many people to justify why they do not guarantee them. He proposed to talk about “human dignity” instead.

3.4 In Search of Global Justice and Democracy: What Kind of Legitimacy in a Pluri-Cultural World Society?

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3.4.1 Security and justice in a pluri-cultural world

Volker Franke focused on the role of security and justice in an increasingly pluri-cultural world. He argued that development and security are intrinsically linked, and political stability, economic prosperity and lasting peace are dependent on the prevention and successful transformation of violent conflict. He concentrated on the question if, and how, effective domestic conceptions of
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justice can be extended/adapted to the global level to ensure the security of individuals and groups, protect their rights and adjudicate among their different and often incompatible interests.

According to Volker Franke, three main concepts or questions underlie any discussion of global justice:

1. The scope of justice: Are there any objective ethical standards that apply to all humans? (moral universalism).
2. Distributive justice/equality: The just distribution of resources, wealth, public goods and opportunities. Since the current distribution worldwide is unjust, the question is what the causes for poverty are and how they can be overcome.
3. The institutions responsible for operationalizing and enforcing global justice: How can the institutions and their enforcement mechanisms be sustained?

As Volker Franke outlined, the UN recognized the correlation between development and security when it adopted the concept of human security and called attention to the empirical reality of threats to the security of individuals. Until then, state-centric approaches to security and justice had been dominant. Still, in academic debates he observes a lacking of systematic discussion of the normative foundations underlying the concept of human security. Three questions should be central to any assessment of risks and threats to human security and the vulnerabilities of individuals whose security is threatened:

1. Is there an essential, shared, universal normative core of human security that merits protection across space and time?
2. What is the security-freedom tradeoff? To what extent ought the protection of human security constrain the exercise of individual rights and freedoms?
3. How to prioritize among threats to human security, protective mechanisms and recipients of those protective mechanisms?

To resolve the conundrum between safeguarding freedom and increasing security, John Rawls proposes a system of justice as fairness, following two main principles, equal rights for each person, and the difference principle. Rawls’ expansion of his concept to the international level, to a “Law of Peoples” (1996), assumes that “reasonably just constitutional liberal democracies” agree on a well-ordered international basic structure of association. This assumption is still state-centered and nationalist, and therefore international, not truly global.

Instead, Amartya Sen argues that development can and should be defined in terms of expanding political, social and economic freedoms, transparency and security. Sen’s concept is close to the idea of human security. Individuals hold multiple identities, “plural affiliations”, and these demands can supplement or compete with each other. Volker Franke asked what this meant for the future of democracy and global justice in a pluri-cultural world society? Is economic development more important than democracy or do the exercise of political rights and freedoms justify economic inequalities? Sen believes that both are interconnected and that people’s conceptualizations of economic needs depend on public debates.

Global justice in a pluri-cultural world society, Volker Franke concluded, must justify norms within a universal frame, but their implementation may vary substantively by context, in part as a result of social power structures. Empirical research should examine how different actors participate in risk, threat and security discourses and who has the power to define the norms. The dominant state-centric approaches to advocating global justice – including Rawls’ Law of Peoples and to measuring
human security - neglect the fact that, especially in fragile states, non-state actors are often called upon to step in and govern.

3.4.2 Social justice at the global level

Rainer Tetzlaff asked how the conditions can be created which make social justice and hence development possible at the global level.

Presenting African concepts of social justice which focus much more on compensation to the community than on punishment of the culprit, Rainer Tetzlaff outlined that there are different concepts of justice besides the western ideal. Referring to Amartya Sen, Rainer Tetzlaff stressed that the discourse on social justice is what really matters: the prevention of injustice in the world is much more important than the actual creation of a totally just world. He explained that, for example the idea of the “Make Poverty History” campaign, although he does not share Jeffrey Sach’s big push approach, was relevant.

In reality however, Rainer Tetzlaff certifies the West double moral standards by pointing to the Doha-Round: While western governments protect their own markets, they demand the further liberalization of the markets of developing countries. The Western concept of Global Governance is continuously losing its relevance for African and Asian governments who are offered an increasingly attractive alternative to the Washington Consensus policies by China. Chinese engagement in Africa poses a great challenge to Western relations with developing countries: Should we adapt to the Chinese option of output legitimacy instead of our concept of input legitimacy? Should we adapt to the non-Good-Governance option?

To enhance social justice in the world, Rainer Tetzlaff suggested some possibilities: One is to publicly denounce unfair government practices, another is to support advocacy groups and civil society groups in Europe in order to improve the fairness in South-North relations.

3.4.3 Global Governance as a tool

Inge Kaul looks at Global Governance as a tool or instrument which can be used according to the required goal in the field of global interdependence. She sees a necessity of cooperation of leaders to deliver global public goods to their national constituencies. Nevertheless, there are differences in priorities and the willingness to act when it comes to global goals such as the management of HIV/AIDS or climate change.

Today’s international negotiation fora are marked by monopoly, hegemony or oligopoly, and information asymmetries. The most affected by these practices are small delegations from developing countries which on the one hand cannot attend parallel sessions besides the main negotiation and on the other hand cannot afford to send their delegations to meetings all over the world, so that they are disadvantaged in many ways. Hence, she argued, the current situation does not permit these negotiations to yield the policy outcome that poor countries find attractive.

In her view, the contentious issue is not the goals, but the policy response. Her proposal is to change the preferences of actors (if one still believes in rational actors) so that they cooperate, although cooperation may not be their first priority. Furthermore, Inge Kaul suggests constructing
international cooperation in a way that the outcome is mutually beneficial. The aim should be to achieve mutually fair and beneficial outcomes of international negotiations, and not aid. She explained that the price for international cooperation must be adjusted, and one should learn from economic markets to create competitive markets for international negotiation.

What is needed is a Global Governance system for very specific issues, and cross-cutting fora to find a balance between issues and to identify the stakeholders and potential actors. The used regulations and tools must be shaped in a way that allows a more equal distribution of overall gains. At the moment, for example the financial crisis gets much more attention and resources than climate change. Moreover, the role of the state should be rethought. De facto, the state acts as an intermediary between the nation and external constituencies.

To achieve fair Global Governance, the process of Global Governance must be fair. The G20 may be an opportunity, but the General Assembly must be changed as well, since a more effective executive body is needed. Global justice can be achieved through a bottom-up process, nationally and internationally, as a result of negotiation. Justice should not be given or granted such as aid, because this is being resented. According to Inge Kaul, the market-based private-good-approach in Durban showed that a new face of neoliberalism is entering the international stage. But she pleads instead for markets and states: States should do more than just embed the markets and at the same time Global Governance should find ways to strengthen the state.

3.4.4 Plenary Discussion
The discussion showed that legitimacy and accountability in international negotiation arenas play a significant role for their success. It was underlined that legitimacy in international negotiations cannot exist without accountability, and currently, the state is the only actor that can be held accountable. The question is how other actors such as multinational companies can be held accountable as well and be involved in the discourse of global justice.

Volker Franke stressed, that one should first get the normative framework before starting the operationalization and conceptualization. The research question could focus on security and development perceptions and ask what legitimacy means for local populations as a starting point for further investigation. The challenges for the new center were seen in the determinants as well as obstacles of reform.

The economic approach was criticized in so far that it looks at aggregated comparative standards without taking into account living conditions and qualities of life. It was warned not to economize culture.

3.5 Summary and End of Workshop
Tobias Debie summed up five relevant issues of the whole workshop:

1. Does culture matter? The answer was yes and no, since the application of the concept needs to be issue-specific. One has to look at the participants of international negotiations and their homogeneity. It is interesting, in how far negotiators and mediators are professionals and are educated or not.
2. The “professional” or “organizational culture” is an important tool. This becomes more difficult to say about “civilizational culture”. Here one should always reflect the term while using it, because this could be just another word for “western ways”. “Ethnicity” and “national culture” are also important, but here we can fall in a cultural trap. Interestingly, the term “political culture” was not used at all. The question here is how one could revitalize this concept.

3. There are different versions of democratization, a statist, a cosmopolitan and a post-modern version. Many of the workshop’s participants stuck to the statist view, even if many of Jan-Aart Scholte’s arguments were very good.

4. Inequalities are important to address, because we observe very different opportunities to participate in global arenas. This is related to the question of justice, which can have different meanings. One should concentrate on fair procedures and means.

5. With regard to research designs and methodology a normative framework is needed. Comparative case studies will play a role. The added value of the project will be the inclusion of symbolic arenas in addition to the rational-actor view.