'They go to the experts, and for them this is Google'

Interview with Blayne Haggart and Natasha Tusikov about new forms of governance and research outside bubbles

'Climate change pushes cooperation in science'

Interview with Dirk Messner about the next generation of questions, a bottom-up approach and the interdisciplinary field

Populisms and science in an 'Age of Anxiety'

A panel discussion on counter-narratives in Europe and beyond, report on p. 24, videostream on the Centre’s Youtube channel

Contents

Policy Research: Centre’s Agenda
Policy Fields: Introducing the Centre’s Research Agenda Sigrid Quack 2
Governance of the Internet A Conversation on All Things Internet, and the Internet of Things Interview with Blayne Haggart and Natasha Tusikov 4
Humans and Machines: Cooperation in Digitization Research Christoph Bieber 6
Governance of Climate Change Centre’s Unique Research Position Interview with Dirk Messner 8
Climate Change and Migration – a Global Challenge Robert Oakes 10
Governance of Peacebuilding Re-orienting Peacebuilding under International Competition Florian P. Kühn 12
On the Current State of Peace – and the Need for New Approaches to Peacebuilding Patricia Rinck 14
Migration Governance Entanglements of Public and Private Authority within Migration Joseph Anderson 16
The Governance of Refugee Returns Zeynep Sahin Mencutek 17

Columns

New Fellows, Alumni News 19
Event Reports 20
Reviews 26
Selected Publications 27
Imprint 18

ISSN 2628-5142 (print)
ISSN 2629-3080 (online)
Policy Fields: Introducing the Centre's Research Agenda

By Sigrid Quack

As we saw in the previous issue of Global Cooperation Quarterly the Centre's research agenda is organized around two major themes: 'Pathways and Mechanisms of Global Cooperation' and 'Polycentric Governance'. In addition, we put a special focus on empirical research in four policy fields: global governance of climate change, peacebuilding, the internet and migration. In all these fields, urgent transboundary problems that cannot be solved by actors within nation states alone call for global cooperation, but this cooperation also faces significant challenges. Focusing our empirical research on specific policy fields has theoretical and practical advantages which we would like to highlight in this issue of Global Cooperation Quarterly.

While one could think of many more policy fields in which global cooperation is urgent but difficult, we have chosen these four fields because they represent variation along several dimensions that we consider relevant for understanding global cooperation. Among these dimensions are the presence or absence of state, private and civil society actors in global cooperation; the patterns and intensity of their relations to each other; the relative strength or weakness of multilateral institutions relative to more diffuse governance architectures; and the relative duration of global cooperation, where its evolution over time may create liabilities as well as opportunities for subsequent developments.

There are three reasons why we believe that the study of policy fields will enrich the Centre's research on global cooperation. First, the chosen policy fields provide empirical grounds to explore the plausibility and validity of theories and concepts developed at the Centre in respect to the two major organizing themes. Empirical exploration along these lines is likely to provide additional insights that in turn can foster theory development and concept specification. Take the thematic area of 'Pathways and Mechanisms': faced with gridlock in many parts of the multilateral system, a number of alternative pathways towards global cooperation have emerged, ranging from global city networks and coalitions of the willing to hybrid public-private arrangements. These pathways vary not only in forms and patterns of cooperation, but also in their geographical scaling. Not every trajectory of global governance might start as a global initiative from the beginning, since local, national or regional trajectories can be scaled up over time. Similarly, research on ‘Polycentric Governance’ is enriched by the study of policy fields. Not only can different theories of polycentric governance enter into a fruitful dialogue with each other when applied and confronted with empirical findings from a variety of policy fields. Concepts such as institutional complexity or assemblages can also be further specified and developed in the course of empirical inquiry about how state and non-state actors are involved in polycentric and polyarchic governing in policy fields formed around transboundary issues.

Second, studying a limited number of policy fields allows us to compare forms, pathways and architectures of global cooperation across these fields, thereby also facilitating communication across these two research themes. Comparing architectures and processes across different global policy fields is a useful method to assess under what boundary conditions basic human cooperative capacities are mobilized for global cooperation and in which ways and with what effects global cooperation unfolds. Comparisons can also contribute to a better understanding of how, why and with what consequences governance of a global problem is distributed across geographical scales (local, national, regional and planetary) as well as actor constellations (public, private, and public-private combinations). Between policy fields, we are likely to find variation in the degree of overlapping institutional mandates, as well as in the extent of blurred hierarchies and lines of command among the various governance agencies.

Last but not least, focusing on common policy fields facilitates interdisciplinary exchange and discussion at the Centre. Studying a common empirical phenomenon makes it much easier for people coming from different disciplines and applying different theoretical approaches and methodological traditions to talk with each other.

While we believe that the study of policy fields is theoretically and empirically fruitful for understanding the conditions, processes and limitations of global cooperation on transboundary problems in the 21st century, it also raises important conceptual and methodological challenges.
One important theoretical question is how to conceptualize global (as world-encompassing) or transnational (as cross-national or cross-continental) policy fields? Bourdieu’s field theory has been suggested as a useful framework, but as Bucholz (2016) suggests, his concept of social field has also to be modified when applied to the global scale, because it was developed in national contexts where these are embedded in clearly structured political systems. However, such systems are absent or only minimally developed at a global scale. Therefore, the question arises how to conceptualize global policy fields as analytical equivalents without carrying over assumptions from national contexts that do not apply. A second important methodological question relates to the fluidity of boundaries of emergent global or transnational policy fields. How should we compare fields whose boundaries are being recurrently redrawn by the involved actors, as can be observed in cooperation on environmental and sustainability issues? Thirdly, how should we deal with potentially urgent issues of transboundary cooperation that have not yet received the attention of policy makers? Lastly, how can we make sense of interwoven, overlapping and multi-layered structures and processes in different issue areas, as well as newly emerging policy fields at the nexus of existing ones, such as the field of climate change-induced migration? These are some of the questions that research on global cooperation at the Centre seeks to address and answer in the coming years.

References

Sigrid Quack is the Director of the Centre for Global Cooperation Research and Professor of Sociology at the University of Duisburg-Essen. She can be reached at quack@gcr21.uni-due.de.
A Conversation on All Things Internet, and the Internet of Things

Interview with Blayne Haggart and Natasha Tusikov

Quarterly Magazine (QM): Your expertise contributes a fresh perspective on internet governance and of the political dimension of data interpretation. What motivated you to pursue this project at the Centre?

Blayne Haggart: At the Centre, we are working mainly on a manuscript concerning the political economy of knowledge and knowledge governance. Scholars are looking at the internet, data and intellectual property in this context. What we thought was missing was a more general approach, showing how this has transformed our society. Particularly in my field of international political economy, there is very little work on this. Intellectual property, telecommunications and now data, have been more niche issues. Our book tries to fill that blank.

Natasha Tusikov: The control over data and knowledge has become integral to economic functions. An example is John Deere (JD), a US-based manufacturer of agricultural equipment, which is now a data company as well. Its tractors are able to collect data about soil conditions and rainfall. JD aggregates the data and sells it back to farmers. What we see here, as with companies like Google and Apple, is the production of a database, where the companies control the use of the data. As a criminologist and regulatory scholar, I am interested in these new forms of rule enforcement in a data intensive economy.

Blayne Haggart: We came to Europe also because we wanted to get out of the US-North American bubble.

QM: Your work deals with new structures but is rooted in traditional political science. Would you say that these tools hold up as explanations of emerging areas like internet governance as well?

Blayne Haggart: Certain ideas in political science stay eternal. You can’t get away from power; whether it’s through parliaments or informal agreements where governments coerce companies into ‘voluntary’ agreements. Political scientists already have the tools to understand these new forms of governance. The idea that the control of knowledge is important for the exercise of politics is not new at all. What is novel is the medium, which is digital. The actors are novel, but their motivations - money, power, spreading disinformation or knowledge - these are not.

Natasha Tusikov: I always go back to the roots. The foundational questions - who benefits, who loses out, and who becomes collateral damage - these are old, standard questions. This is important when looking at the internet of things: to not be dazzled by technology, by the ‘newness’ of it all.

QM: Your research talks of something that you term ‘the weakening of ownership’. Could you elaborate on that?

Natasha Tusikov: We see this with the internet of things: the idea that software is embedded within physical goods. The software is governed by copyright and the company selling the software gets to set all the rules about how you use the product and to what extent. We have seen this type of rule-making before, applied to software and digital content, music and movies. Now we are seeing it applied to physical goods. So it’s an older type of governance being newly applied to physical goods. This is affecting how we understand the ownership of software-embedded physical goods, and our right to repair, for example.

QM: If data, collected by companies, is aggregated and used to explain to a certain extent the behaviour of a population at large, what happens to the ownership of this data?

Natasha Tusikov: There is a mass of data sets and companies that make a great deal of money. And these predictions are often really problematic, coloured by perceptions of race, class and gender. We see this in the area of criminal justice, where we have incredibly racialised data. This is also true of wearables. Private companies like Apple can decide what is healthy, and firms like FitBit can set arbitrary middle-class standards for what it means to be healthy universally, and governments may use this data to roll out health policies and insurance plans. These private companies also chose only certain types of data to monitor. For example, Fitbit doesn’t have a setting for users to indicate that they’re
pregnant: FitBit just tells pregnant users that they’re eating too much and exercising too little.

Blayne Haggart: This is also nothing new. What’s changing is who we think are the real authorities here; not the bureaucrats and scientists, but increasingly engineers, ‘tech bros’. We assume that our data presented back to us is impartial, and it’s not.

QM: You mentioned coming out of the US-‘bubble’ to Europe, but from a Global South perspective, EU is still a ‘bubble’. Multinational companies operate with much dodgier legal loopholes in many developing countries. How do you reconcile this in your work?

Natasha Tusikov: This is a challenge you always bump into when trying to look at things in a transnational way. We identify and categorise some of the broad trends with largely US-based companies and look at how these mechanisms are being propagated by specific combinations of corporate and state actors in the USA and the EU. We have done field work in Brazil. We wanted Brazil as a particular example because it’s a country that has fought long and hard about internet governance. It’s much ahead of Canada, for example. In South America, Brazil is a real norm shaper. A part of my research also looks at how norms and regulations set in USA affect Chinese platforms. We acknowledge of course that our work is not exhaustive; it’s a step forwards and we hope that other scholars take up some of these ideas and carry them forward.

QM: So the structure of internet regulation depends greatly on the government. In a transnational sense, it’s a double bind: the risks of no regulation versus surveillance.

Blayne Haggart: The concerns depend on the political and economic context, whether it’s Google or Apple in the USA, China’s surveillance system, or Aadhar in India. In our book we pose the same questions in each case: who is going to set the rules here, and in whose interest? And then you look at what these rules should look like, which brings incredibly valid concerns: can the system be secure? Is this going just to recreate social inequalities?

Natasha Tusikov: It’s also a part of being aware of what rule making means. It occurs through all sorts of norm and standard setting. When someone says we should regulate social media, we may imagine that governments will play a central role. But companies are already involved in setting and enforcing rules through their Terms of Services. They decide what counts as hate speech or unacceptable obscenity. If we don’t have laws, companies will decide this. In 2011, the US tried to introduce very strict legislation to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights online. But after massive online protests, the bills fell through. As my book examines, what we got instead was a secret handshake of agreements between companies and governments. In retrospect, the bills, as problematic as they were, would have been preferable, as the bills’ text would have been public and subject to judicial interpretation.

QM: You have recommended that a regulator should not co-regulate with the vendor; this is also an EU issue.

Blayne Haggart: Yes, but at least within EU you have a structure. It is not just companies but also labour groups that are at the table. But local governments are often not well-versed in digital jargon. They go to the experts, and for them this is Google.

Natasha Tusikov: And Google has massively expanded its lobby to facilitate this.

QM: Would a balance of stakeholders at the table be a solution?

Blayne Haggart: I am a critic of a certain idea of multi-stakeholderism. It’s an attempt to escape perception that there is still power at the table; an assumption that all interests are equal and a rational decision is possible. But this is not true. In my work I draw on Susan Strange, who sees this basically as a power game between the state and the market. In internet governance many think that what’s good for Google is good for the internet, but scholars and analysts recognise that that’s not the case.

QM: Would you then say it is a kind of paywall?

Natasha Tusikov: It’s a legitimacy or expertise paywall, so if you are not an engineer or a lawyer in these groups, it’s difficult. Companies control the narrative, and have introduced many ideas like the so-called ‘sharing economy’. In our project here, we try to unpack this and we ask: can we come up with alternative ideas? Blayne and I have been talking about taking several steps back. Instead of data ownership structures, we need to discuss data collection itself, and ask: should some data even be collected in the first place? Should companies be allowed to commodify them? We cannot stop all data collection, but this is where good regulations come in.

QM: Thank you so much for giving us your time and for this great conversation. (Interview conducted by MB and MW)

Blayne Haggart and Natasha Tusikov are current fellows at the Centre. Blayne Haggart can be reached at bhaggart@brocku.ca, Natasha Tusikov at ntusikov@yorku.ca.
Humans and Machines: Cooperation in Digitization Research

By Christoph Bieber

Unsurprisingly, cooperation is a key issue within the field of digitization research. Since the early years of computing, communication among scholars, sharing of data and discussing the results of digital work have played a central role for the discipline. Already in the 1980s, the term ‘computer-supported cooperative work’ (CSCW) set a framework for assessing the effects of multiple modes of cooperation enabled by digital technology. Along with the dynamic development of computers, networks and new gadgets, cooperation constantly triggered new research perspectives: The establishment of working groups increased the need for polling and balancing the various interests among the members. With the advent of the Internet and its continuous growth, development and standardization of protocols became central tasks to sustain and strengthen the structure of the network. New authorities, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), discussed and established new strategies for organizing communication, consent and decision making. Their famous rule in favour of operational pragmatism still functions as a guideline for cooperation within the digital realm: ‘we believe in rough consensus and running code.’

In a similar perspective, the principles of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) emphasize the possibilities of cooperation among developers and users, while sometimes blurring the lines between the two modes of working with computer systems. Having access to the source code enables qualified users to modify existing software and to generate new applications in different contexts – outside of the software industry and in contrast to its market-driven mechanisms. Thus the spirit (or, as some might say, the ideology) of openness is defining one of the fault lines of digital culture, often and intensely discussed in the economic and political epicentres of the digital, such as Silicon Valley, CERN, Brussels, Tel Aviv, Seoul, and probably with another intonation, in China. 

The idea of sharing and cooperating is not limited to the definition of technical standards or software development, the terms ‘social software’ and ‘social media’ point toward much broader fields that can be marked as cooperation-based. Among many others, Wikipedia is likely the most prominent example of the productivity of non-profit group communication and online-cooperation. Although the Wikipedia community is not free of problems (ideological bias, digital vandalism, edit wars, lack of diversity, to name just a few), it is one of the most popular websites and still generates not only new content, but also spurs offline activities related to various segments of digital culture. Taking its various challenges into account, Wikipedia still is an example of cooperative work in favour of the common good – it illustrates the ability of decentralized communities to create, curate and monitor innovative content beyond traditional market economics. ‘Commoning’ as a cultural practice has already motivated various research projects and is considered to be one key element in the process of digital transformation.

Currently, social media platforms provide the largest and most popular environments for personal communication and exchange on the Internet, and cooperation is one of the drivers of their growth and success – although social media companies tend to emphasize their focus on the individual user, the richness, benefit, and power of social media platforms are dependent upon the willingness of the user to share personal information and to organize communication and cooperation among each other. It is no surprise, that platforms invest enormous energy and resources in improving the user experience in order to attract and bind their members. During the last years, this
approach has become more universal and has slowly invaded every fabric of the digital lifeworld.

Political actors have only realized the importance of social media alongside a series of events, such as the Wikileaks revelations, the so-called 'Arab Spring', various 'Occupy'-movements, election campaigns, or, most recently, Mark Zuckerberg’s announcement to release 'Libra', Facebook’s projected 'digital world currency'. Especially in the aftermath of the 2016 US election, the difficult relationship between digital corporations and politics revealed potential conflicts. Since then, several Internet companies are in constant exchange with political actors around the globe and increasingly take centre stage in socio-economic conflicts: Facebook vs. US; EU vs. Google-Amazon-Facebook-Apple; US vs. Huawei; China vs. the rest of the world. The global nature of digital communication automatically leads to national as well as supra-national constellations, thus the processes of negotiation, deliberation and decision-making turn much more complicated.

And still, it might get even more diverse: with the advent of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, a new level of cooperation is in sight. The intertwined nature of man-machine-cooperation sparks new potentials as well as new challenges for discussion and regulation. Especially the ethical dimension of man-machine-interference has already activated a lively public discourse about the need for transparent algorithms, data ethics, and machine behaviour. This discussion is no ‘science fiction’ – even without a human-like (or, super-human) form of ‘superintelligence’ there are AI systems establishing ‘cooperation’ between humans and machines, based on large amounts of data embedded into complex routines of algorithmic decision making. The notorious self-driving car is only one use-case among others, similar questions in regard of ‘machine behaviour’ arise with virtual assistants like Alexa or Siri, robo-lawyers like DoNotPay or LawGeex, and digital healthcare solutions like IBMs Watson Health.

Given this continuous and versatile impact of cooperation on digital and analog facets of social life, organizations like CAIS and KHK/GCR21 will find a huge array of subjects for research. One of the key issues is the interdisciplinary nature of the research questions, thus new institutional arrangements, innovative methods and creative researchers are needed to find the right questions within a dynamic field of research ahead of us.

CAIS

The Center for Advanced Internet Studies is a recent addition to the scientific landscape in North Rhine-Westphalia, it is a joint effort of the universities of Bochum, Düsseldorf, Münster and Duisburg-Essen and the Grimme Institute, Marl. Since 2017 CAIS supports research on various topics related to the process of digitization and its effects on society. It offers fellowships and finances working groups and conferences. In 2018 the centre was integrated into NRWs digital strategy and it is planned to extend the structure into a genuine research institution which has its own team of scientists and implements interdisciplinary research programmes. CAIS is also a member of the Network of Centers, which is an international group fostering cooperation between similar research institutions.

Christoph Bieber is the Scientific Coordinator at the Center for Advanced Internet Studies (CAIS) in Bochum and Professor for Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen. He can be reached at christoph.bieber@cais.nrw. CV: https://www.cais.nrw/en/cais_en/team/bieber_en/.
Governance of Climate Change: Centre's Unique Research Position

Interview with Dirk Messner

QM: Climate change and its implications have constituted a vast area of research since 30 or 40 years. On impressive panels over the years almost every detail of this topic has been scrutinized. What can the Centre’s approach contribute to this research?

Dirk Messner: The focus and the angle of the Centre is of course to understand how global cooperation might work to solve the climate crisis. We understand the climate crisis and the impact of climate change from a natural science perspective more or less well. But we need to understand better, how cooperation can be organized to move towards a process of managing the climate change challenges and the below 2 degree Celsius guard-rail.

QM: In the Centre’s research agenda, the governance of climate change is one among four policy fields. How do you see the field in the context of the Centre’s research agenda.

Dirk Messner: At the Centre we try to understand the specificities of our different areas: climate change, migration, peacebuilding and the internet. What makes climate change specific and what we try to understand are probably four things. First, the climate regime changed the perspective with the climate agreement from 2015 in Paris. It was a shift in perspective from a hierarchical regime towards a bottom-up regime. The hierarchical regime was about defining how rapidly and how much countries need to reduce carbon emissions. And now, countries are asked to formulate what they would like to contribute. So it’s a shift in perspective and we try to understand how mechanisms, which organize compliancy, work or do not work. A second element is that this process started as a global environmental regime but everyone understands now that this is actually about the future of the global economy. Because reducing the carbon emissions implies that we re-organize the basic infrastructure of the global economy, which includes the energy systems, the urban systems, and the land use systems. This is an interesting issue because people sitting around in climate change negotiations are still the environmental ministers but they are talking about the future of the global economy. A third aspect is that science played a crucial role in global governance. As you know, science is very well organized around the field of climate change and climate dynamics. The impact of the IPCC on the negotiation processes and the impact of the science actors in the global negotiation processes are very specific and this is probably the most advanced field in this regard. And the other way around, the climate change challenge pushed cooperation in science forward. I would like to see this also in other science fields: That political pressure translates into a better organization of the science actors themselves. My last point is that this is a really interdisciplinary field. We need natural sciences to understand the actual problem and then we need lawyers, sociologists, political scientist, economists, behavioural scientists to find solutions. Our Centre is interdisciplinarily orient-ed. We can bring different knowledge pools together in order to find solutions to this pressing global problem.

QM: Because of its global dimension the use of big data seems to be appropriate and promising, especially in this field. Where do you see the chances but also the challenges of big data research?

Dirk Messner: Climate science and the understanding of weather and climate patterns over thousands of years is about big data analysis already. Climate scientists are looking at huge amounts of data and are using huge computers and storage capacities to model the climate system. The next generation of questions is whether we might use artificial intelligence and deep learning systems to understand the patterns of climate dynamics even better. To make this paradigm shift clear: Springer Science published, only some weeks ago, their first book, produced 100% by an artificial intelligence system. In their programme you find the author as ‘Beta Writer’. Beta Writer is a technical system. The book is about the state of the art in the field of battery research. So, artificial intelligence systems are now capable in analysing and synthesizing knowledge. This has not been possi­ble without deep learning systems and I am pretty sure that this development will also deeply impact climate research in the future.

QM: In a paper last year you proposed a climate passport for climate refugees. This seemingly alluded to a structural similarity with regard to stateless people in the past. What is the scenario behind this?

Dirk Messner: Regarding small islands states we already know that with a temperature rise around 1.5 - 2.5 degrees, several of these islands will simply disappear. Migration will emerge and accelerate and refugees will move to other territories. People are losing their citizenship. And the question will be how to manage this humanitarian challenge. As we do not have a global climate refugees regime, these people wouldn’t have access to any immediate support. We suggest a climate passport. They idea behind is very simple. Countries polluting a lot and countries emitting a lot should care re­sponsibility for these people (‘polluter pays’ principle). This is about global justice. The historical analogy is the
Nansen passport. Fridtjof Nansen, a scientist and one of the most important polar scientists of his time, invented in 1918, being a commissioner for the Völkerbund, this kind of transnational passport. After World War I this passport has been recognized step by step by more than 50 countries around the world and saved many people.

QM: The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions happens – and will happen only – at a quite different speed among states and also between different actors in society. Are there models for the coordination of these quite different developments, also regarding the Global South?

Dirk Messner: Based on the aforementioned ‘polluter pays’ principle those who have been emitting more greenhouse gases, need to reduce their emissions at high speed. The first group here are the OECD countries. The second group, which is equally important already, are the so-called emerging countries: China, Turkey, Brazil, others. The emissions per capita in these countries are still lower than in industrialized economies, but they are growing rapidly. So without rapid de-carbonization in the OECD world and countries like China we cannot mitigate dangerous climate change. There is a third group: the developing countries. They do have more time to decarbonize because their levels of emissions are often very low. The average emissions per capita in most African countries are below 2 tonnes per year. We in the Europe emit between 7 and 15 tonnes per capita. But at the end of the day, towards 2050, all countries and their economies need to be de-carbonized. If we do not get this done, we will not stay below the 2 degrees guard-rail.

QM: You have been a leading expert in the T20 process of think tanks around the G20 summit in Germany. Now in Japan the G20 are again meeting with climate change and environment on top of the agenda. Being the Director of the United Nations University Department of Environment and Human Security now, how do you see the role and the task for scientific research on those platforms?

Dirk Messner: I think the role of science is very important for this kind of dynamics. First, we need to understand better the impacts of climate change on different country groups, regions, sectors. It is still very difficult for climate sciences, to predict climate change impacts for local areas; most models are very good to demonstrate climate impacts on global and macro-regional levels. Nation states and local communities need to decide on how to adapt to climate change. Better knowledge can support such decisions. And then we need to develop feasible solutions for de-carbonization processes. As I already said, we have to re-organize our energy, urban and land use systems and there are many issues that we need to think through. The role of science is to develop a repertoire of solutions. Knowledge is also important for civil society actors. Many people understand and accept the climate crisis, but they fear transformations towards sustainability because these create uncertainties. To overcome uncertainties and fear, science can help to communicate successful solutions. Political actors need to decide about many things all day long. The role of science here is to insist on important trends, which societies shouldn’t neglect.

QM: There are established strategies of civil society actors to put pressure on decision makers so that these would change laws, protect endangered populations and counter environmental degradation. As we speak, experts, activists and investors pick up a pulse from protests that unite a considerable part of the next generation across Europe, across ‘our country first’-countries, so to speak, what is happening here?

Dirk Messner: I think we see two trends. We do have these ‘our country first’-movements, actors driving a counter-transformation. People, feeling that we are losing control, are asking for easy solutions and the nation state, walls, authoritarian structures seem to be such easy solutions. And then we shouldn’t neglect that there are winners and losers of globalization. Many are not profiting from these transnational trends and they are asking for having a voice. And nationalists and right wing movements are giving these people a voice. On the other side, if you look at the European elections now, we can see a political spectrum emerging, asking in the field of climate change, for rapid action. And a next generation of younger people is asking for investments in their future. We are in a tipping point situation here. Right-wing movements and ‘our country first’ developments opposite to a strong call for investing in transformations towards sustainability.

Interview conducted by Martin Wolf

Dirk Messner is the Director of the Institute for Environment and Human Security of United Nations University (UNU-EHS) since 2018 and Co-Chair of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU). He is a co-director of the Centre for Global Cooperation Research since its foundation in 2012.
Climate Change and Migration – a Global Challenge

By Robert Oakes

Climate change and migration are arguably two of the most pressing global challenges of the 21st century. Their interaction, climate migration is also a hot issue. People are already moving as a result of environmental and climate change; according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, there were 16.1 million new weather-related displacements in 2018. At the same time, science is increasingly able to link specific events to climate change while media framings often represent the issue as a threat to sovereignty. This creates a strong desire both within affected states and the international community to better understand the drivers of climate-related migration, its impacts and to develop policies to protect affected people.

Risks and responses in the Pacific

At UNU-EHS, we try to give context and nuance to this picture by carrying out people-centred research. In particular, we are interested in finding out more about the processes which interact to trigger flows of migration in order to feed into policy processes to protect affected people and encourage more adaptive forms of migration. A recent project demonstrates our approach by gaining a deeper understanding of migration in the Pacific. The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the region are at the forefront of climate change and migration. Due to their location and topography, they are exposed to climate change-related hazards. As developing countries, they have comparatively low economic and technical ability to adapt and respond. The situation for Kiribati and Tuvalu is particularly acute; their low-lying land is exposed to sea level rise and they are recognised by the United Nations as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with limited resources. They also have limited opportunities to move internationally. As a result, dominant discourses in the Global North explicitly or implicitly suggest Pacific SIDS governments and their residents are inherently lacking the agency to help themselves and are dependent on aid to adapt to climate change or move.

However, it is not that simple. For one thing, representatives of these nations are unwilling to represent themselves as helpless victims. Instead the Pacific SIDS community has sought to move the discourse from that of Environmental refugees and narratives of extinction to more agential understandings and the concept of migration with dignity; whereby through training and the development of diaspora networks, migrants are empowered. It is in this context that UNU-EHS conducted the Pacific Climate Change and Migration (PCCM) project. One of the most alarming findings from the study is that in the period 2005 to 2015, over 90 per cent of households in Kiribati and Tuvalu were affected by environmental conditions such as floods, storms and irregular rain. We also found that many households are already using migration as a way of coping with the increased risk, with 12 per cent of movements in the same period mainly attributed to environmental change. Interestingly, we also found that many people stated that they would have liked to move in the same period but were unable to do so as they lacked either the money or the paperwork to migrate. This is particularly true for international migration. Under projected climate change scenarios this lack of options will continue and intensify trends of urbanization with more movements from the outer islands to the capitals recreating or intensifying existing risks as increasing populations in South Tarawa in Kiribati and Funafuti in Tuvalu. This ‘triple jeopardy’ of climate change, economics and demography therefore suggests that Pacific SIDS could be in a state of increased risk.
The need for a people-centred approach

However, structural factors are not the only barrier to migration. We used in-depth qualitative methods to try to better understand the processes affecting migration decision-making and found that views on climate-related migration in Pacific SIDS are multifaceted and can be contradictory. On the one hand, people seem to feel that migration offers opportunities – particularly for younger people. But on the other hand, we also found that islanders have a strong desire to stay on their islands and in their countries. People seemingly tolerate a degree of climate-related impacts in order to avoid losses to culture and home. Of course, these barriers can have limits and each person or household may have a threshold, after which the desire to leave overcomes the anchoring power of home. If and when this occurs depends on objective realities such as the financial and legal ability to move but also subjective understandings of home, and hopes and fears of life in a new location relative to home.

Relating to policy

The situation for Pacific Islanders and others affected by climate change is brought into sharp relief when the lack of international frameworks for protecting migrants is considered. The post-2015 development agenda has a new focus on both migration through the Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Compact on Migration. Their links are addressed through the Paris Climate Agreement which created the Task Force on Displacement, mandated to create recommendations to ‘avert, minimise and address’ migration as a result of climate change. However, until now there is no overarching international framework to protect climate migrants and realistically there is no universal desire to do so. In this vacuum, the state-led Platform on Disaster Displacement plays a vital role in guiding governments on how they can best protect their citizens. Equally, different levels of governance are important. Recently regional approaches have been adopted in South America, and national guidelines have been written for Fiji. Each of these processes needs science and people-centred research has a role to play. People do not necessarily want to move, and if they do, their preferred form and destination may not align with authorities’ expectations. As our research shows, if climate risks, mobility and decisions are perceived differently and through the prism of culture, then they should also be addressed through approaches which are mindful of culture. If not, there is a danger that false assumptions about people’s desires and responses will result in ineffective policy, whether it is to promote adaptation at home, or to facilitate successful and dignified forms of migration.

Further Reading


Robert Oakes is a senior researcher in the Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability & Adaptation Section at the Institute for Environment and Human Security of United Nations University (UNU-EHS). He can be reached at oakes@ehs.unu.edu.
Re-orienting Peace-building under International Competition

By Florian P. Kühn

Peacebuilding leads a double life as both too narrow and too ample a concept in the 21st century. This contribution focuses on the topic from a ‘Pathways and Mechanisms of Global Cooperation’-perspective, highlighting recent and more long-term trends in the politics of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding describes a set of political, economic, and security-related activities aiming to establish institutionalized social relations able to channel, and ultimately solve political conflict without resorting to violence. It is distinct from peace-making, which brings the parties in conflict to the table using political incentives, pressure, and if necessary, force; peacebuilding is broader as ideally it also addresses the structural drivers of conflict, such as inequality, identity-based polarization (often so-called ‘ethnic’ conflict), or lack of state and societal capacity. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is a mostly UN-led activity to secure a (often precarious) peace-deal or ceasefire, usually backed up by the military and enshrined in an internationally mandated mission. The politically transformative impetus, e.g. to change the political equations of conflict parties, is lower in these missions as compared to peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding, as broad as its aims usually are – one might even say it is a catch-all category – has however a limited epistemic background. It is based on an implicit assumption that the liberal system has indeed won the Cold War. The notion of the ‘end of history’, as popularized by Francis Fukuyama, following a Hegelian understanding of history as evolution of a ‘world spirit’, informs much of peacebuilding’s international practice. Unsurprisingly, peacebuilding as a policy has evolved since the 1990s and has become an ever more sophisticated set of tools in justification of capitalist economic activity and democratically legitimated elite politics. International organizations prided themselves in purporting the ostensibly neutral policy of expanding the zone of peace around the globe. The ‘Pathways For Peace’ agenda, co-sponsored by the World Bank and United Nations (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO) among others, is a recent expression of this program emphasizing the prevention of conflict. It acknowledges many of the structural causes of conflict, but presents a liberal-economic recipe as uniform cure which rests on growth and equal distribution of opportunities. It calls for inclusive decision-making, obscuring the exclusivist competition of majority democracy; essentially, states are held responsible for becoming resilient even to external shocks.

International peacebuilding is tasked with preventing the conflict(s), more precisely the violent execution of conflict, while continuing and even pushing for social transformation and capitalist expansion. Unequivocally in this notion of ‘progress’, international institutions support the international order of states understood to provide the platform for social conflict to be channelled and hedged in; this is not surprising as these institutions are founded and run by states. Vice versa, states can be intervened into if they fail to protect their citizens under the notion of an assumed international ‘responsibility to protect’. Inevitably, this perspective turns opponents of modernization or those who have grievances because of modernization’s effects, particular groups who compete with others for power and influence, as well as those seeking culturally or religiously distinct ways of organizing society, into enemies of progress.

Notions of progress are situated precariously within equally relevant readings of ‘order’. The international system, of which the international organizations engaged in peacebuilding are an expression, assumes state domination as ultimate source of authority. Hence, political conflicts need to be solved on the national level – but they may become an international challenge if they turn out to be irresolvable within existing polities. Consequently, the international system heavily privileges groups holding the insignia of official political actors – incumbents of office with officially recognized functions. Others have little place in influencing political decisions or practice, or even...
voicing their concerns and political alternatives. Even the vocabulary to express visions of social order beyond the state seems to be missing.

Emancipation, as a consequence, is only sanctioned within the existing structures. Attempts to change the structure, or to transform the constraints the existing order provides to radical reform, are thus curbed and its proponents marginalized. Peacebuilding is, despite its rhetoric of empowerment and emphasis on the local level, anti-emancipatory in that it follows a narrow script deeply enshrined in existing power relations which favour ‘official’, ‘state’ and ‘legal’ channels of political exchange. Often, these fail to provide for the economic needs or to deliver the political opportunities that sub-state groups with no official representation crave. Peacebuilding in these not-so-rare cases becomes complicit in stabilizing an illegitimate order, which may be the reason conflict turns violent in the first place; rather than providing a platform for the political transformation of conflicts, it may reproduce the conflict it is expected to be solving. In addition, the peacebuilding notion of ‘peace’ provides for de-politicizing conflict and relegating it to a managerial task, wherein ‘settlements’ can curb violence merely by being ‘inclusive’.

What space does this leave for peacebuilding? How can it be reformed, to fulﬁl its potential and the hopes placed by many individuals who are subjected to prolonged war and inter-group as well as international and internal violence? The return of ‘great power’ competition and turning away from international agreements by notably the United States but also others who subvert liberal practice from within and without, may turn out to provide potential for a re-orientation of peacebuilding. Geopolitics and geo-economics may turn out to be less concerned with proﬁt than with economic control, e.g. in cases of withholding economic manoeuvrability from others in a zero-sum consideration. The already-fragmented landscape of peacebuilding – putting different concepts of peace at its core, using multiple instruments, differing paces and dynamics of peace and conﬂict dynamics, to name a few – may become even more fragmented as more ‘great powers’ flag ‘peacebuilding’ as their tool for achieving foreign policy goals.

However, in a renewed emphasis on (great) power competition in the international realm also lies a number of opportunities. If international organizations such as the UN become visible as secondary to states again (as they used to be during the East-West-confrontation) and less as their sturdily liberal embodiment, they may return to credible neutrality; they may be able to bring their expertise to the table, which ought to focus more on non-Western forms of knowledge and rely less on US East-coast academic advisors; they may even develop a broader set of expertise as new sponsors and international support becomes available. The UN in general, but also their specialized sub-organisation, may become a useful source for cooperation and conﬁdence building among powers infested with considerations of inter-state rivalry. Individual peacebuilding missions may remain politicized but also be tailored better to the needs of conﬂicted states and work with more modest and realistic aims. Needless to say, the risk of being held hostage for particularistic ends, and of being instrumentalized for a paymaster’s beneﬁt is not going to disappear from peacebuilding altogether. The emerging parallel worlds of ‘great games’ of state power on one hand and messy, devastating and deadly violence on the sub-state level (while often with decisive inﬂuence of state funding and support on the political level, suggesting cross-connections between both levels) on the other, call for a new orientation of epistemes, practices, and legitimation of international peacebuilding.

Florian Kühn is a current fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. He can be reached at kuehn@gcr21.uni-due.de.
On the Current State of Peace – and the Need for New Approaches to Peacebuilding

By Patricia Rinck

Recently, the Peace Report 2019, a joint yearbook by the institutes of peace and conflict research in Germany, was published. With the title ‘Forward into the past? Peace needs partners’, it paints a rather bleak picture of the current state of peace worldwide. As data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program shows, the number of violent conflicts has increased in recent years, culminating in a 20-year high in 2017, with 131 conflicts of at least 25 deaths per year, 11 of which qualified as wars (i.e. there were at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year) (BICC et al. 2019: 49). Even apart from current armed conflicts and wars, the picture looks gloomy, as data from the recently published Global Peace Index 2019 shows. Although the average level of global peacefulness has slightly improved since last year, the world is still considerably less peaceful now than a decade ago.

And yet, looking at the rankings, the data contain some unexpected, positive surprises that seem to suggest that international peacebuilding has been extremely successful at least in some cases. Sierra Leone, for instance, whose brutal armed conflict ended only 17 years ago, ranked 52nd out of 163 countries in the 2019 Global Peace Index shows. Although the average level of global peacefulness has slightly improved since last year, the world is still considerably less peaceful now than a decade ago.

This little comparison resonates with familiar debates about conceptualizations of peace and objectives of international peacebuilding. It points to both successes and challenges of peacebuilding, which is often successful in restoring statehood and some degree of stability, but usually does not adequately take into account the concerns of the population, and therefore fails to achieve peace in the broader sense. In Sierra Leone, for instance, international peace- and statebuilding have clearly resulted in improvements in security, democratization and economic development. However, the elite-led process, which was mainly focused on institution-building at the national level, did not address the root causes of the conflict, which are closely linked to problematic state-society relations. While the elites have benefited most from the post-conflict process, others, especially vulnerable groups such as women and youth in the countryside, are still marginalized.

The difference is due to the underlying definitions of peace: the Global Peace Index is based on a negative definition of peace, measuring the state of peace in terms of the level of societal safety and security, the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarization. As the name itself suggests, the Positive Peace Index is based on a positive definition and a much broader understanding of peace, including pillars such as a well-functioning government, a sound business environment, an equitable distribution of resources and acceptance of the rights of others. Sierra Leone’s performance further deteriorates if one enters gender equality into the equation: in the 2017/2018 Women, Peace, and Security Index, which bridges insights from gender and development indices with those from peace and security indices, the country took one of the last places in the ranking, ranked at 137 out of 152.

While Sierra Leone is usually praised as one of the UN’s biggest peacebuilding success stories, this result is still surprising. And indeed, when you look at Sierra Leone’s performance in other peace indices, you get a very different picture. For instance, in the Positive Peace Index 2018, published by the same think tank, the Institute for Economics & Peace, Sierra Leone only ranked 128th out of 163.
Life in Sierra Leone has become much safer since the end of the armed conflict but people continue to struggle with everyday life. For instance, if you are a pregnant woman in Sierra Leone, you will of course not die from armed conflict now, but your chances of survival are still not too good. Despite the overall improvements, Sierra Leone still ranks last with regard to (the latest estimates of) maternal mortality (WHO 2015). Sierra Leone’s relatively high ranking in the Global Peace Index could in a way gloss over the fact that everyday life is still very dangerous, and hence not peaceful, to a significant part of its population.

What can one deduce from this? As the new Peace Report concludes in its recommendations, stabilization policies must address the root causes of conflicts, and the current focus on mainly working with government counterparts and strengthening security forces and administrative structures is often counterproductive. New partners as well as new approaches that are able to better take into account and reflect the interests of the population are needed. One way of getting there, I suggest, is to turn away from conventional conceptualizations of peacebuilding-as-statebuilding, and understand peacebuilding as a cross-cultural relational endeavour instead, thus emphasising the importance of relationship building in the process and prioritising the issues that matter most to those for whom peace is being built (Boege and Rinck 2019). By conceptualizing peacebuilding as relational, it becomes clear that the marginalization or instrumentalization of ‘soft’ aspects of peacebuilding, such as spirituality or emotions, and the disregard of local actors’ priorities as pursued in mainstream liberal peacebuilding is not conducive to peacebuilding. Understanding peacebuilding as relational is one step forward on the path towards positive peace.

References

Boege, Volker and Patricia Rinck 2019. The Local/International Interface in Peacebuilding: Experiences from Bougainville and Sierra Leone, International Peacekeeping, 26:2, 216–239.


Patricia Rinck leads the publication management department of the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. She is a PhD candidate researching post-conflict transformation and political settlement issues in Sierra Leone and can be reached at rinck@gcr21.uni-due.de.
Entanglements of Public and Private Authority within Migration

By Joseph Anderson

Even as control over migration is often seen as one of the core functions of states, currently the processes of exerting that control frequently include the involvement of non-state actors. This is perhaps most obvious in the context of the securitization of migration. In guarding against and redirecting unwanted migration, private companies are hired to help run migrant detention facilities, handle deportations, build walls, and provide technological solutions to manage the movements of people. Yet private actors are also extensively involved in processes of helping migrants move, whether through their involvement in managing temporary worker programmes or helping wealthy individuals buy citizenship. In both contexts, the critical question is how the involvement of private actors alters how migration processes take place.

The focus of my research has been on "Temporary Migrant Worker Programs" or as they are often colloquially referred to, guestworker programs. These visa schemes allow sponsoring employers to bring in migrant workers for limited periods of time to do specific work. They are often focused on particular economic needs and a desire to not create a class of permanent migrants, so workers are often tied to working for only the single employer specified in their contract and do not have any legal basis for pursuing long-term settlement. While such programs are often associated with Asia or the Gulf countries, such guestworker programmes are also found in many other places such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and in European countries. While these guestworker programmes are state-sanctioned, their day-to-day-functioning often features the extensive involvement of private actors. This includes not only the employers that migrants work for, but also the brokers who manage the connections, recruiters who find workers and agents who handle paperwork, among others.

That the involvement of these private actors has become so pervasive, in many cases becoming fundamental to the operation of these programmes, raises questions about both the balance and the entanglement of state and private control and authority in these programmes. While the involvement of private actors in various realms is not a new phenomenon, in migration or elsewhere, research in migration, centered around a focus on the 'migration industry' has only somewhat more recently taken these issues head on. Therefore, a focus of my research at the Centre has been thinking about how other fields of research can offer insights about how to frame this complex dynamic between public and private operate within migration.

One area of research that has been instructive here is that of critical security studies. This comparison is fitting not only because security is likewise seen as a core function of the state, but also because many of the private actors involved in migration provide security services. Therefore, I have been considering how the theory developed within critical security studies can be translated into the realm of migration—looking not just at the private actors that work to keep migrants out, but also those who help bring them in. The use of critical security studies literature is here valuable because it is a field that has long considered the enmeshment of public and private interests and examined, among other things, the role of private expertise, how private actors alter the control functions of states, the role of contracts in outsourcing, and how the use of private actors fit within larger state functions and competencies. The conceptual toolbox developed in security studies to analyze the complex interactions and blurrings between 'public' and 'private' holds promise for better understanding the intricate web of actors and processes that govern international migration.

Joseph Anderson recently developed this research project as a research fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. He can be reached at joseph.anderson@gu.se.
Return migration is a quite dynamic and complex phenomenon driven by contested concepts, approaches and controversial practices. The issues related to the returns in cases of mass forced migration have received comparatively less attention, although return is proposed as one of the durable solutions towards refugee protection. Many host countries of refugees in the Global South are often impatient to see a return, while the Global North seeks ways in which to cooperate with the home countries of the Global South for returns and readmission. Refugee returns is a matter of migration governance. However, the governance of refugee returns is rarely looked at from a comprehensive institutional perspective. More specifically, lenses of polycentric governance are promising, when examining the role of organizational structures, and the formulation and implementation of rules in such a complex policy field. An emphasis on recent return cases may provide insights to unpack the moments, processes and dynamics surrounding refugee returns. In this regard, the return of refugees from hosting countries to Syria is an exemplary case.

Since 2011, the war in Syria has led to the massive internal displacement of almost 6 million Syrians within the country and the forced migration of more than 6 million people from Syria to neighbouring countries, mainly Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. In the 8 years of Syrians’ protracted displacement, their return to the country of origin has been increasingly on the agenda of host countries. The governments of host countries are under domestic political pressure to force or give incentives to refugees to return to their homes soon. This is happening despite the fact that the war has not reached a peaceful resolution yet. This is partially attributable to the very low resettlement options elsewhere, particularly after the so-called EU-Turkey deal, and to the policies of neighbouring countries, which consider integration of millions impossible and provide only temporary protection to Syrians. However, instead of adopting a strict policy in facilitating the returns against the Syrian refugees’ will, these countries use their ‘soft power’ and encourage returns through manipulation of information, or locking them in a precarious temporary position for a long time, or putting different degrees of pressure on refugees, leaving refugees with no option besides spontaneous returns.

With an empirical focus on Turkey, which hosts around 3.6 million Syrian refugees, the project examines several issues related to refugee returns. The polycentric governance framework enables the better identification of discourses, policies and governing practices. It helps in mapping multiple actors such as public, private, civil society actors involved in the return processes from Turkey to Syria. Particularly, it sheds light on the interactions between Turkish government, EU and transnational migration agencies, like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International Organization of Migration. These interactions generate the many forms of bilateral/transnational cooperation, coordination, and contestation that can be found in the conceptual tool box of polycentric governance.

The first phase of the project highlights Turkey’s approach towards encouraging spontaneous and limitedly assisted returns since the summer of 2017. Turkey’s practice of allowing Syrians to visit their country before making a final decision via the three-month religious festival travel facilitates returns. Moreover, Turkey is involved in reconstruction and stability-building activities in the northwestern region of Syria, where majority of the returns happen. However, there are several concerns about Turkey’s unilateral return approach, such as lack of monitoring of Turkey’s return practices, instability and insecurity in the areas of return, lack of post-return assistance for returnees, and the negative impact of the growing return discourse on the treatment of refugees by host communities.
Scientific Advisory Board

In a meeting held on 8 April 2019, the Scientific Advisory Board of the Centre appointed Mirjam Künkler, Professor at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS), as its speaker and Siddharth Mallavarapu, Professor at the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University (SNU), as its deputy speaker. The Board discussed various issues related to the current research at the Centre and the strategic framing of the next steps and further initiatives.
Researchers and Themes

New Research Fellows at the Centre

with affiliation, duration of stay, and research topic at the Centre

Dr Amya Agarwal
University of Delhi, India
1.6.2019 – 31.5.2020
Alternative Perspectives on Cooperation: Construction and Mobility of Ideas and Practices in Conflict

Prof. Dr Wolfram Kaiser
University of Portsmouth, England
1.6.2019 – 31.5.2020
Transnational Integration and Democracy Narratives: Dynamics in European Cooperation in Historical Perspective

Dr Florian P. Kühn
Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC)
1.6.2019 – 31.5.2020
Ambiguity and Peace – How Ambiguities Influence Global Cooperation

Alumni News

Gerald Chan will be a Visiting Professor to the Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2019, working on a project on China’s maritime Silk Road.

Jonathan Joseph, who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Sheffield and was a Senior Fellow at GCR21 in 2017 has a new position as Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Bristol. Jonathan informs us that the papers from the workshop ‘Resilience and Hegemony: Questioning Adaptation Discourses “Exploring a New Wave of Critical Approach to Resilience”’ held in Duisburg in January 2018 are now published online in the journal Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses. https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showAxaArticles?journalCode=resi20.

Since April 1, 2019, an interdisciplinary project of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK) and three other research institutions - financed by the Leibniz Association - on the disintegration of international cooperation has been running. Titled ‘Drifting Apart: International Institutions in Crisis and the Management of Dissociation Processes’, it has case studies on Brexit, Russian-Western Security Relations, China’s Role in Global Financial Institutions, Iran’s Separation from the West and the Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Alumni fellow Dirk Peters has helped to acquire the project and coordinates it: https://www.hsfk.de/en/research/projects/drifting-apart-international-institutions-in-crisis-and-the-management-of-dissociation-processes/.

Susan Erikson was the lead editor of a special issue of Anthropologica, entitled ‘Document/ation: Power, Interest, Accountabilities’.

Alejandro Esguerra, co-editor of ‘World Politics in Translation’ in the Routledge Global Cooperation Series, took up his new position at Bielefeld University in the Faculty of Sociology, where he joins another alumni, Professor Volker Straßheim.

For fresh publications of these and other fellows see page 27.
The Centre held its first Annual Conference, on ‘Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Global Cooperation Research’, on 9 and 10 April 2019. Organized at the University of Duisburg-Essen’s (UDE) Gerhard-Mercator House, it provided an ideal platform for an interdisciplinary collaboration between UDE and institutions like the German Development Institute, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen and other institutions of the University Alliance Ruhr and also within UDE’s different institutes and faculties.

After the opening remarks by Petra Stein, Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences and Volker Steinkamp, Vice Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, UDE, the first session set the paradigms within which global cooperation is researched at the Centre. The next session problematized the normative positive implications of development cooperation, where Paulo Esteves and Stephan Klingebiel looked at the norm-setting practices of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Cagla Diner looked at the global politics of debt in Turkey. A session on labour governance highlighted the interdisciplinary scope of the conference, with presentations ranging from Anja Weiß’s work on why highly skilled migrants return to their countries of origin, to Thomas Haipeter and Sophie Rosenbohm’s analysis of how employee representation in multinational companies may set new pathways for transnational cooperation.

In a special panel focused specifically on governance in Africa, Christof Hartmann observed the effects of membership overlap of African states in regional organizations on peacebuilding, Adam Sandor focused on how transnational organized crime (TOC) needs more attentions in African security discussions, while Christoph Marx looked at how Gandhi as a political figure worked as a bridge between two post-colonial nations, India and Ghana. In a parallel session on the discursive aspects of global cooperation, Katja Freistein and Christine Unrau looked at how narratives of rightwing populism make anti-globalism popular, Lucas Graves and Laurenz Lauer shared their research on the International Fact-Checking Network, and Andreas Nieder-
berger presented a philosophical argument on how cosmopolitanism has always historically been utopic.

Climate and Migration are two of the Centre’s core policy fields. In a session dedicated to climate change, Robert Oakes’ presentation combined the two themes. He observed that most environmental migration today is within national borders, but will soon be international as changes in rainfall and floods limit the choices, and global mechanisms must adapt to be prepared for the possibilities. Another session on urban studies saw contributions ranging from literature to policy studies: from Christoph Heyl’s history of Edinburgh’s ambitions of fashioning itself as a ‘global city’ or the Athens of the North, to Blayne Haggart’s case study of Google Skywalks Lab in Quayside, Canada and global data governance. The final session of the two-day long extensive conference looked at the prospect of democratic governance today. Here, Philip Liste presented on his ongoing research, on loopholes in transnational law and tax avoidance, and Tobias Debiel presented on his and his colleagues’ research on the shift in the quality of democracy in donor countries and its effects on democracy aid and promotion.

Thus, the Centre’s first Annual Conference saw active participation from audiences and generated fascinating conversations, and set a positive precedent for future conferences to come. (MB)
Event Reports

13th Käte Hamburger Dialogue

Endless Peacebuilding? The Missions in Afghanistan and Mali

On 29 April 2019, the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21) held its 13th Käte Hamburger Dialogue in Berlin. The Dialogue, organized in collaboration with the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) was on 'Endless Peacebuilding: The Missions in Afghanistan and Mali'.

Tobias Debiel (KHK/GCR21), introduced the both cases as conflicts at crossroads, and set the stage to discuss if the endless peacebuilding was also goalless peacebuilding. The Keynote, delivered by Clemens Hach, focused on on-ground limited mandates international actors receive in such conflicts, and the boundaries of 'local realities' being shaped by primarily the local government or authorities. In Mali, as in other conflicts, Germany’s mission has been military in nature—working with local actors to see how interventions can strengthen the legitimacy of local authorities. These interventions are limited in their own scope, as well as the scope of the “local” they interact with, but they create a space for peace keeping and perhaps a long-term peace building, through civilian interactions. Hach ended his keynote with the probing questions – when are we part of the solution and when are we part of the problem? And what extent of intervention can a conflict afford?

Julia Leininger (DIE) observed that there are many layers of accountability that a peacebuilding process weaves itself through—it involves the dynamics between international organizations, domestic governments, donors, international governments and civilians but the ultimate success of a peacebuilding process cannot exclude the local process. These interventions are limited in their own scope, as well as the scope of the “local” they interact with, but they create a space for peace keeping and perhaps a long-term peace building, through civilian interactions. Hach ended his keynote with the probing questions – when are we part of the solution and when are we part of the problem? And what extent of intervention can a conflict afford?

Julia Leininger (DIE) observed that there are many layers of accountability that a peacebuilding process weaves itself through—it involves the dynamics between international organizations, domestic governments, donors, international governments and civilians but the ultimate success of a peacebuilding process cannot exclude the local process. These interventions are limited in their own scope, as well as the scope of the “local” they interact with, but they create a space for peace keeping and perhaps a long-term peace building, through civilian interactions. Hach ended his keynote with the probing questions – when are we part of the solution and when are we part of the problem? And what extent of intervention can a conflict afford?

Tobias Debiel (KHK/GCR21) introduced the both cases as conflicts at crossroads, and set the stage to discuss if the endless peacebuilding was also goalless peacebuilding. The Keynote, delivered by Clemens Hach, focused on on-ground limited mandates international actors receive in such conflicts, and the boundaries of ‘local realities’ being shaped by primarily the local government or authorities. In Mali, as in other conflicts, Germany’s mission has been military in nature—working with local actors to see how interventions can strengthen the legitimacy of local authorities. These interventions are limited in their own scope, as well as the scope of the “local” they interact with, but they create a space for peace keeping and perhaps a long-term peace building, through civilian interactions. Hach ended his keynote with the probing questions – when are we part of the solution and when are we part of the problem? And what extent of intervention can a conflict afford?

Julia Leininger (DIE) observed that there are many layers of accountability that a peacebuilding process weaves itself through—it involves the dynamics between international organizations, domestic governments, donors, international governments and civilians but the ultimate success of a peacebuilding process cannot exclude the local process. Isaline Bergamaschi observed the linkages between the endless war on terror, endless intervention and endless peacebuilding in Mali. Florian Kühn stated that conflicts are multi-layered and as international actors, we know relatively little about how they develop on the ground. Depending on the level and mode of intervention, the conflict appears different, but all actors are inevitably enmeshed in the local politics and try to affect it. The case of Afghanistan, as a rentier state is a particular example. Intervening actors either have to fight the local and existing international structures profiting from this economy, or have to get co-opted into it themselves. Peace interventions thus inevitably head towards being a problem, but to what extent in case of each conflict, we find out only later. Thus, peace interventions thus inevitably head towards being a problem, but to what extent in case of each conflict, we find out only later. Katja Mielke focused on the need to first, politically and historically contextualize current conflicts, and second, as international actors, pay attention to the research produced by local researchers.

The lively audience observations that followed enriched the panel with debates on how to best utilize the Monitoring and Evaluation reports on conflicts, and the relationship between peacebuilding and development. The vote of thanks by Conrad Schetter (BICC) tied up the Dialogue, with a call for a re-positioning our focus as peacebuilders, from looking for exit strategies to keeping the country of conflict and its interests at the centre. (MB)
At a critical juncture in global politics, Pan-Africanism contains resources for the defence, reinvigoration and reinvention of a more just, equal and rule-bound multilateral world order. At the same time, its nativist reflex and defence of difference carry particular risks in a context where strikingly similar viewpoints are promoted by New Right movements.

In the 31\textsuperscript{st} Käte Hamburger Lecture, Prof. Rita Abrahamsen made a case for taking Pan-Africanism seriously within IR debates about world order. Developing a morphological analysis, she argued that Pan-African ideology is a fluid and historically contingent patterned way of thinking about the social and political world. As part of global constellations of ideas, power relations and problematics, it provides strategic guidance for political action in international affairs. Abrahamsen identifies three contending visions of world order within Pan-Africanism: a world of continental unity and transnational solidarity; a world of national sovereignty; and a world of racially defined units. The current world order was not ‘made in the West’, but produced in interaction with Pan-African ideas and values. Understanding the manner in which Pan-Africanism informs and legitimizes diverse political agendas is thus of crucial importance for IR, for Pan-Africanists, and for the future of world order.

Adam Sandor, currently a research fellow at the Centre and a former student of Prof. Abrahamsen, and Prof. Christoph Hartmann, Chair of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, whose focus lies in International Relations and African Politics, provided the comments on the lecture. A lively discussion followed, during which the audience showed great interest in Abrahamsen’s ‘morphological approach to ideology’ and debated the various forms of ‘afro-politanism’. Abrahamsen reflected on forms of a possible ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak) and the identitarian potential of yet-marginal positons, in the context of recent populist developments in many parts of the world. (MB)
Event Reports

The 14th Käte Hamburger Dialogue was inaugurated with the welcome address by Karl-Rudolf Korte, Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) and Director of the NRW School of Governance (NRWSG). He focused on the importance of institutional stability and integrity in maintaining a democracy. This was supplemented by the introductory remarks by Sigrid Quack, Professor of Sociology (UDE) and the Director at KHK/GCR21, who reiterated that the phase of looking at global cooperation as a macro-level phenomena comprising mainly of talks at the international level has passed, and the need to look at the impact of national politics on global cooperation is back in focus. In this context, a dialogue on populism has become imperative.

The panel’s exchange of ideas was prefaced by the opening remarks by Christine Unrau, Research Group Leader for “Pathways and mechanisms of global cooperation” (KHK/GCR21). She set the context for the discussion, pointing out the potential linkages between populism(s) and the many ways in which they reject global cooperation and suggested that there is a need to ask why such rejections have become so much more appealing in recent times and how, as academics and also as citizens, we should position ourselves in this context. The first input, by Benjamin De Cleen, Assistant Professor at the Department of Communication Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), stressed on the need for conceptual and theoretical clarity, in differentiating between populism and nationalism and seeing them as two different concepts that may be empirically well-connected to each other, and may work as a composite in certain cases. Increasingly, populism and nationalism are being used in a combination in European politics and he suggested the need to understand why this combination has become popular. The next panelist, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics, Department of Politics and IR at the University of Reading, posited that there was a demand and supply structure to the rise in right wing populism. While on the demand side the factors are both cultural and economic (like fear of competition in labour markets), the new nationalism is thus something that right wing parties supply. And this works because it is a ‘civic’ form of nationalism, which doesn’t alienate of racial or ethnic terms, but ostensibly on secular terms. Next, providing a historian’s perspective on things, Wolfram Kaiser, Professor of European Studies, at University of Portsmouth, drew a parallel between Europe pre- First World War and Europe today, locating in both an ‘Age of Anxiety’- a fear of future decline and insecurity in a rapidly changing world that Nationalism feeds on. The final input was made by Taylan Yildiz, Research Associate, Chair "Political System of Germany", NRWSG (UDE), who focused on the narrative techniques employed by populism. He observed that the technical aspect that gives populism power is not from the simplicity of its examples but stems from the power of narration.

In the active audience participation that followed, the impact of populism on development cooperation, and the negative impacts of global cooperation in the context of collaborating populisms, were among the topics touched upon. Moving towards a ‘solution-based’ outlook, Daphne Halikiopoulou stated that the counter to the populists cannot be to embrace their techniques, for populism sometimes appears to draw from democracy, but in reality is antithetical to the very premise on which democratic institutions are built and function. Wolfram Kaiser added that we do need more emotive narratives of global cooperation. Thus, the 14th Käte Hamburger Dialogue surmised the imperative need to counter populism, not just for the benefits of global cooperation, but for the survival of liberal democracy itself. (MB)
Event reports

A video documentation of the 14th Käte Hamburger Dialogue and an interview with Daphne Halikiopoulou can be found on the Centre's Youtube channel.

https://www.youtube.com/user/GCR21channel

Originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, this book challenges the understanding of ‘difference’ in the field of peacebuilding and offers new ways to consider diversity in the context of international interventions. The ‘problem’ of difference has always confounded the practitioners and academics in the field of international peacebuilding. The local views, histories and cultural codes, which seem obstacles on the way to peace for mainstream policy-makers, are on the other hand indispensable for critical scholars. Current approaches to peace building also often fall into the trap of being blinkered by only Eurocentric lenses. In this context, this volume approaches this ‘problem’ of difference from multidisciplinary perspectives. The chapters are differently inspired by feminist, poststructuralist, and new materialist perspectives and the authors within the volume focus not just on theory but also the practice of difference, with case studies including Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan and Congo. This book thus makes a major contribution to the field of critical peacebuilding.


In a field as vast as contemporary migration, this volume enriches the academic debates on the politics of migration with quantitative analysis, and creates, via empirical data, an effective tool to study the field. Centered with a focus on the EU’s migration policies, the volume looks at, on one hand the EU’s extensive use of biometric technologies like the Visa Information System (VIS) to screen migrants, and on the other hand the persistence of migrants seeking residence and occupational mobility with the EU. The book also responds to criticisms of autonomy of migration, with an analysis of the dynamics of mobility control through the control of migrants’ bodies (through biometrics), and how migrants themselves appropriate them. Through these methods, the volume develops migration autonomy as a viable approach within border, migration and security studies.


This volume presents work that is the first of its kind - a systematic analysis of the 2012-14 Brazilian National Truth Commission. Assembling within a single book voices from different perspectives and different areas of expertise - from some of the leading experts, scholars, human rights activists and practitioners - the volume manages to delve deep into Brazilian local and national history and political context. The authors cover a range of these, from the practices of censoring history in Brazil and the legacy of the Brazilian dictatorship to the dynamics of fact-finding and Truth Commissions in the digital age. What makes the volume even more impressive is that, at the same time as being grounded in the national context, it maintains an outward-looking perspective as well. Within the context Latin American politics, the volume presents a comparative analysis of Truth Commissions in El Salvador, Peru and Brazil. Further, the book also situates Truth Commissions in the transnational and global perspective.
What follows is a list of new publications of the Centre’s current and former fellows and staff as well as authors from our wider academic network. We publish an updated list and invite you to inform us about your recent contributions to the field of global cooperation research. The published list represents a selection of titles that we feel are substantive contributions to the field.


Research Agenda
A detailed elaboration of the Centre’s research agenda is available on the Centre’s website:
https://www.gcr21.org/research/research-agenda

20% Discount Available with discount code GCR20*

Routledge Global Cooperation Series
Series Editors: Tobias Debiel, Dirk Messner, Sigrid Quack, Jan Aart Scholte
www.routledge.com/books/series/RGC/

Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East
By Zeynep Şahin Mencutek
284 pp | 2 B/W Illus.
Hb: 9780815346524  eBook: 9781351170369
£115.00  £92.00

Mapping and Politics in the Digital Age
Edited by Pol Bargués-Pedreny, David Chandler, Elena Simon
230 pp | Hb: 9780815357407  eBook: 9781351124485
£115.00  £92.00

The Routledge Global Cooperation series develops innovative approaches to understanding, explaining and answering one of the most pressing questions of our time – how can cooperation in a culturally diverse world of nine billion people succeed? This interdisciplinary series welcomes proposals from a wide range of disciplines such as international relations and global governance, environment and sustainability, development studies, international law, history, political theory or economy which develop theoretical, analytical, and normative approaches concerning pressing global cooperation questions.

* 20% discount offer is only available on titles ordered directly from www.routledge.com and cannot be combined with any other offer or discounts.

Global Cooperation Research Papers
ISSN 2198-1949 (Print)
ISSN 2198-0411 (Online)
doi: 10.14282/2198-0411-GCRP-[issue]

Global Dialogues
ISSN 2198-1957 (Print)
ISSN 2198-0403 (Online)
doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-[issue]

Every Wednesday...
... we tweet the Centre’s MID WEEK BRIEF on current affairs under the lense of our policy fields. Our twitter bird loves to cite statements from fellows and affiliated scholars as well as public figures related to our research.

www.gcr21.org 2.0

The Centre’s new website displays in a new responsive design on your portable devices and provides a new section. ‘Opinion’ invites contributions to current topics and focuses - among others - on recent developments in the Centre’s policy fields: climate, peacebuilding, migration and internet.