"This is a moment of societal transformation"
Julia Pohle, WZB, on a panel ‘Future Internet Governance Strategy for the EU’, Internet Governance Forum, Berlin

"Only states are able to adopt and enforce"
Ilona Stadnik, Saint-Petersburg State University, reflects on international cybersecurity and cooperation in global digital policy

"Slow consensus building is essential for the EU"
Wolfram Kaiser delivered the European Parliament Research Service Annual Lecture in Brussels

Populism will not trash international organizations, says Jens Steffek p. 12.
Cooperation games. 'Enter Africa' presented by Hannah Grüttgen on p. 25.
Editorial

This issue completes the first year of the Centre’s Quarterly Magazine and we hope that you enjoy reading as much as we enjoy producing and publishing it! This year’s Internet Governance Forum in Berlin provided an opportunity to reflect on our policy field ‘Global Governance and the Internet’. The Centre’s co-director Jan Aart Scholte and his research group presented fresh results of an inquiry into the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (page 5). Martin Wolf opens the section with a discussion of reform proposals in the final report of the UN High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation (HLPDC). Many applaud that the SDG process is complemented with an updated strong digitization strategy. We appreciate also the contribution from Ilona Stadnik (Saint Petersburg State University) on security cooperation, which touches upon our policy field of ‘Governance of Peacebuilding’ as well.

This issue continues with two current research projects at the Centre. Senior fellow Jens Steffek addresses ‘Why Populism Will Not Trash International Organizations: A Weberian Perspective’, which relates to the Centre’s ongoing analysis of the populist trend. Stefania Maffeis, who has written an intellectual biography of Hannah Arendt, looks at migration from a history of ideas perspective in search of the possible foundation of a theory of global solidarity.

We are delighted that our senior fellow Wolfram Kaiser was invited to hold the European Parliament Research Service Annual Lecture in Brussels (page 18). Further reports in this issue feature a variety of Centre projects. Readers will find useful information on reviews of our past events as well as an outlook and our list of received publications in the field of global cooperation research.

We wish you a happy holidays and thank you for your interest and support during this year. Enjoy reading!

Sigrid Quack

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In early 2018 a whistleblower confirmed that Cambridge Analytica used personal information harvested from more than 50 million Facebook profiles without permission to build a system that could target US voters with personalised political advertisements based on their psychological profile.

In November 2019 it came to light, that a business partnership between Google and Ascension, a major hospital chain and health insurer, has resulted in the transfer of 50 million Americans’ most intimate medical records to the Silicon Valley company, without the knowledge or consent of those 50 million patients. These records were not de-identified.

Chinese Uighurs were the target of an iOS malware attack lasting more than two years that was revealed in September 2019. The attack is thought to be the first large-scale exploitation of iOS vulnerabilities in the history of the iPhone. (all quotes from The Guardian)

Daily headlines seem to confirm UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ observation that

Growing opportunities created by the application of digital technologies are paralleled by stark abuses and unintended consequences. Digital dividends co-exist with digital divides.

Guterres was speaking in Berlin at the opening ceremony of the fourteenth edition of United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), held in Berlin on 25-29 November 2019. Born of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005, the annual IGF assembled about five thousand participants from across geographical regions and social sectors to deliberate burning questions on the Internet and on digital society more generally. This year’s IGF had three headline themes: namely, ‘data governance’, ‘digital inclusion’, and ‘security, safety, stability & resilience’.

Beyond those themes this year’s IGF convened against the backdrop of a report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation (HLPDC). Chaired by Melinda Gates (Gates Foundation) and Jack Ma (Alibaba Group), the Panel was tasked with considering how digital cooperation can contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the ambitious agenda to protect people and the planet, endorsed by 193 UN member states in 2015. The Secretary-General’s action in this regard reflects the perception of many that the SDG process has insufficiently addressed digital issues and their governance.

The HLPDC Report suggests

an initial goal of marking the UN’s 75th anniversary in 2020 with a ‘Global Commitment for Digital Cooperation’ to enshrine shared values, principles, understandings and objectives for an improved global digital cooperation architecture.

(HLPDC, Executive summary)

Telling in this regard was the active participation in the report’s presentation at the IGF of Fabrizio Hochschild Drummond of Chile, the newly appointed Special Adviser on the Preparations for the Commemoration the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations in 2020.
Regarding Internet governance the HLPDC report makes several key observations and recommendations:

- digital technology and digital cooperation issues remain relatively low on many national, regional and global political agendas
- technical bodies and standard-setting organisations are often not inclusive enough of small and developing countries, indigenous communities, women, young and elderly people and those with disabilities
- there is considerable overlap among the large number of mechanisms covering digital policy issues. As a result, the digital cooperation architecture has become highly complex but not necessarily effective
- digital technologies increasingly cut across areas but to create synergies, a common understanding of well-defined roles and issue areas is necessary
- there is a lack of reliable data, metrics and evidence on which to base practical policy interventions (HLPDC, 4.1).

With these points in view and with a motivation to ‘operationalize values and principles’ as enshrined in the Charter the panel proposes three possible architectures for global digital cooperation (HLPDC, 4.2.):

- an emboldened role for the IGF as an ‘Internet Governance Forum Plus’
- a distributed co-governance architecture (COGOV)
- a digital commons architecture.

It is a central proposal of the HLPDC report to decouple the design of digital norms from their implementation. It suggests that norm development shall produce ‘voluntary solutions rather than legal instruments’. Norms ‘could be taken up by government agencies as useful blueprints to establish policies, regulations or laws’. The question of norms was discussed in many sessions during the IGF. Others approached the issue differently than the HLPDC. For example, Anita Gurumurthy from IT for Change argued:

> From the idea of behavioural ethics we have to move towards institutional ethics. We've been talking too long about voluntary ethics of corporations who will benevolently give us better times. They will certainly happen not during my lifetime. I think we do need institutional ethics.

The report also suggests that the IGF’s Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) could include more government and private sector participation. In general:

> The IGF Plus concept would provide additional multi-stakeholder and multilateral legitimacy by being open to all stakeholders and by being institutionally anchored in the UN system.

That presents the vision of a fully developed UN-backed process to reach accord in the global digital governance arena. The HLPDC this way might well provide a cooperation model for the regional level as well. For example, the Middle East and North African (MENA) Open Forum took up the HLPDC report as an incentive to strengthen inter-regional cooperation. Christine Arida (Government of Egypt) took up the idea of a policy incubator to facilitate innovative solutions to policy challenges in the Arab region.

This year’s host Germany, with its Ministry of Economics quite present on the forum, seems to have secured - together with the UAE - a managing role in the implementation of the IGF Plus process, which triggered questions from French and British representatives with regard to how this decision has been made.

The forum in Berlin gave a sense of the overall challenge. Not only because the IGF-Plus proposal itself was debated. The forum’s appeal comes from the variety of issues and expertise at the table, a clash of epistemic communities, so to speak, with a lot of talk about silos and echo chambers to overcome. (See further ‘Highlights from IGF Panels’ on page 9.)

**One Net, One World, One Vision**

The IGF gathered under the slogan ‘One Net, One World, One Vision’. German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her subtle way mentioned that she is more sure of ‘one world’ than of ‘one net’. Unsurprisingly she did not mention ‘one vision’ at all. Instead, Tim Berners-Lee (creator of the World Wide Web) once again provided that vision. His newly released ‘Contract of the Web’ has the backing of many internet leaders and the spirit of a philanthropic endeavor. It may engender a powerful narrative or preclude its decline. What is shared by many – and for sure by most participants at the IGF – is a commitment to an open Internet: structured, maintained and developed by decentralized multistakeholder bodies. The fear might be that the ‘one net’ will not be ‘the open net’. The high-level strategy of the UN Secretariat, lively
debated at the forum, lays out a distributed co-governance architecture intended to effectuate global digital cooperation.

This notion of ‘distributed co-governance’ resonates of our Centre’s explorations of so-called ‘polycentric governance’. Under this label we examine the multi-layered, mixed public-private, diffuse and fluid ways that society (including the Internet) is regulated today. Polycentric governing of the Internet raises many large challenges, including to coordinate multiple institutions, to secure adequate access for all affected people, and to obtain accountability. In addition, the Centre’s research group on ‘pathways and mechanisms of global cooperation’ asks particular ‘questions about the role of (self-propelling) technological development in global cooperation’. With regard to the Internet, this group is interested in what drives this development and how, for example a trans-sectoral elite network (popularly called ‘the multistakeholder community’) develops over time. The IGF Plus process and the institutional aspirations of the HLPDC might therefore open new opportunities for further research at the Centre.

References
IGF Transcripts: https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/igf-2019-transcripts

The Centre’s Research @IGF

As usual, the opening day of the IGF included a symposium of the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet). This year’s GigaNet presenters included recent CGCR fellow Blayne Haggart, who spoke on the governance of global Internet platforms. In addition, CGCR co-director Jan Aart Scholte and future CGCR fellow Hortense Jongen presented their findings on legitimacy beliefs toward multistakeholder global governance at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).

In the IGF itself, Hortense and Jan convened a workshop concerning ‘Inclusion and Influence in Multistakeholderism at ICANN’. The session was moderated by Manal Ismail (Egypt), Chair of ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee. Speakers included Nandini Chami (India), Deputy Director of IT for Change, Leon Sanchez (Mexico), Vice Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors, and Errika Mann (Germany), Internet entrepreneur and former member of the European Parliament. Around 80 other participants from around the world also attended.

Speaking to the IGF theme of digital inclusion, the workshop addressed questions of structural inequality in multistakeholder global governance of the Internet. As multiple speakers stressed, ‘openness’ in Internet governance is not the same as meaningful participation. In particular, the meeting explored hierarchies of influence in the ICANN regime with regard to age, gender, geography, language, race/ethnicity, and sector. Hortense and Jan had prepared a background discussion paper based on their survey of 467 regular participants in the ICANN regime.

A consensus evident in both the survey and the IGF workshop affirms that inclusive participation is highly important for multistakeholder Internet governance. However, a large majority of people also perceive substantial inequalities at play in ICANN’s multistakeholder processes. Participants especially see unequal influence in respect of language (i.e. fluency or not in English) and the geographical divide between global north and global south. They also see gender inequalities to be especially problematic. Interestingly, the survey results show that people in positions of lesser influence on average perceive larger and more problematic exclusions than people in positions of greater influence. Recognition that this gap in understanding exists may be key to reducing these inequalities in future Internet governance.

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We witness today many examples of global governance institutions and mechanisms for addressing issues like economy, peace and security, migration, environment, education. Some of them are more successful than others, however, and states and other actors are coping with global problems in a more or less cooperative way. And with the emergence of information and communication technologies (ICTs), commercialization and the rapid spread of Internet at the turn of the century, states found new areas for global governance: internet governance and cybersecurity.

States became gradually involved in various processes shaping discussions about digital future. Starting with cybersecurity, the process got its first impetus back in 1998. Russia initiated the first UN GA resolution on ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security’ (A/RES/53/70), which for the first time raised the issue of potentially dangerous use of ICTs. For the first time, the resolution called on member states to consider existing and potential threats in cyberspace and to inform the Secretary-General of their views on the issue. Today, risks and potential threats have become a harsh reality; states not only use technologies for intelligence and military superiority, but also for committing illegal actions, the assessment of which often is ambiguous from the point of the application of international law, since sufficient mechanisms of state responsibility have not yet been developed for cyberspace.

Thus, the first cooperation problem for states became the absence of consensus on how to view cyberspace: as a superstructure over physical space divided into sovereign borders of states (it contradicts the decentralized and distributed nature of the global network); or as a separate domain of international politics with its own laws and logic. Another issue was the interpretation of security – whether it is cybersecurity of physical infrastructure or it is information security that extends the concept to include the security of information and content that circulates through the global network. Different interpretations formed the fault line that can be roughly drawn between the ‘Atlantic’ and ‘Eastern’ states; liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. This deep contradiction prevented states from finding common grounds in working out rules and norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace.

This cooperation problem crystalized in the work of the first Group of Governmental Experts on ICT use in the context of international security (UN GGE). It was convened in 2003 and consisted of 15 state representatives, including Russia, the USA, China, Germany, Britain and France. During the year, the group had to review the impact of ICT on international security and submit a consensus report to the Secretary-General. However, because of conceptual difference explained above the group ended its work without a consensus report. After several years the second UN GGE overcame this problem with consensus on the wording ‘ICT use’, leaving ample space to interpret it varyingly. Then there were two more groups in 2013 and 2015 doing well in acknowledging that international law and the UN Charter in particular apply to cyberspace. Also, 2015 report produced a number of cyber norms for states, capacity and confidence...
building measures (CBMs), and it is considered a real breakthrough for international cybersecurity. On this positive wave the 5th GGE in 2017 should have worked out how exactly international law will apply to cyberspace, but this time things didn’t go so smoothly and for the second time in history the group couldn’t produce a consensus report.

Here we come to the second cooperation problem – applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace. The last GGE in 2017 failed due to disagreements among the members of the group regarding the applicability of international humanitarian law. Russia, Cuba, China and other likeminded states saw IHL as legitimizing the scenario of war and hostilities in the context of ICT, while the US and its allies argued it will guarantee protection for civilians in case of cyberconflicts. After the failure, the further format of GGE was highly questioned, and, probably, the 5th GGE would have been the last one, but in 2019 both Russia and the US mobilized efforts and promoted two competing resolutions in the UN. The US called to convene the next GGE, while Russia established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG).

And thus, the third problem became one of coordination. Discussion of responsible behavior in cyberspace began to be held on two separate tracks. Of course, there is a serious geopolitical play behind two groups. Their mandates look quite similar, but the composition and outcomes for each group differs substantively.

The 6th GGE has 25 members and will work for three years 2019–2021 and continue the activities of the previous GGEs, studying further possible joint measures to address threats in the field of international information security. There is a hope that the group will reach a consensus on further clarifications of how international law applies, and possibly new norms and CBMs. At least, the GGE will disclose detailed official positions of states on norms and rules of responsible behavior in cyberspace, as well as the application of international law to the use of ICT by states. This time there is no requirement to have a consensus of all participants for the successful completion of the mandate. A novelty is the involvement of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to hold consultations with regional intergovernmental organizations (the African Union, the EU, OAS, OSCE, and ASEAN) and two informal consultative meetings for all UN member states.

In contrast, OEWG is declared as an open group, implying that it will include all UN member states that express a desire to participate for the next two years 2019–2020. The main task of the group will be to further the discussion on the norms, rules, and principles of responsible state behavior and ways to implement them, as well as to study the possibility of institutionalizing the dialogue on the application of international law on a regular basis under the auspices of the UN. Another innovative distinction is multistakeholder informal intersessional consultations. However, the mandate requires consensus between all members for issuing its final report that could become a great challenge for 70+ states that already participated in the first round of talks.

Though some participants of the groups and international organizations call for a complimentary work of the two tracks, one can already see the difference in attitude towards each of them. GGE is viewed as an experienced platform, that deals with the issue for the last decade or so, while OEWG is crowded with states who are quite new to the agenda. For this reason, OEWG should serve as an awareness platform, work as an instrument of dialog and support in implementing previously agreed principles and measures to secure cyberspace.

So far, we were talking about international cybersecurity undeservedly neglecting Internet Governance (IG), but there are also a plenty of cooperation problems for states. Roughly speaking, cybersecurity can be seen as a part of IG according to different taxonomies.

Looking retrospectively at the first steps to make some global governance arrangements for Internet we can recall the World Summit of Information
Society (WSIS) organized under the UN auspice in 2003-2005. During the WSIS two important things were achieved: a working definition of Internet governance, and creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). IG popularized a new model of global governance: multistakeholderism. The agreed definition of IG uncovers the meaning of multistakeholderism: ‘Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.’ IGF thus serves as a platform for all stakeholders to gather for a joint discussion of current IG issues and problems.

But from the onset, there was a misunderstanding over the term ‘governance’ in this context. For some states, ‘governance’ meant a primarily state-led role in Internet policy development. This laid the foundation for future fault-lines between states and additional cooperation problems. For example, there was a period when Russia, China and like-minded states were advocating to take IG out of the multistakeholder environment, concentrated around ICANN, IETF, IGF and other organizations, and place it under the state control in the UN system, like the International Telecommunications Union, for instance. IGF, where states can participate, has no decisive power, and was for a long time not the focus of their efforts and support. It was even in danger of not renewing its mandate recently, but that was averted and IGF finally has received some interest from the states. The first was French President Macron, speaking about Chinese and Californian models of IG at IGF 2018. This year German Chancellor Merkel was deeply concerned with fragmentation and sovereignization trends for the global Internet. Both of them were referring to the need to find new mechanisms for a better digital cooperation, and IGF, being reformed, might be a new structure for a new multilateralism, enhanced with multistakeholder participation. In parallel, the High-Level Panel on Digital cooperation, convened by the UN Secretary-General, also contemplated on the IGF Plus models, rethinking its mandate towards more practical work.

Thus, over a short period of 20-plus years, the problems of cooperation for global governance have multiplied for states. Security negotiations have never been easy, but such deep contradictions within the space of cyber and information security leave much lesser chance for cooperation. The understanding of security, the application of international law to cyberspace, and the tug of war on different platforms all paint a bleak outlook. But there is still hope. We see the active inclusion of states in IG in recent years. It is not surprising; Internet and the digital space in general has grown so much and captured our lives that now it is not only useful but also creates many risks that must be solved through regulation. Therefore states must adopt and enforce. At the international level, they are contemplating ways to establish coordination for the development of global governance, while trying to preserve the multistakeholder approach, which is a good sign for better cooperation on digital policy development.

Notes

1 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. UNODA website https://www.un.org/disarmament/ict-security


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ROAM-X, a tool for data convergence

The Internet Universality Indicator is a set of criteria (the ‘ROAM-X indicators framework’, https://en.unesco.org/internet-universality-indicators) to measure the internet culture of a country and ‘gain a holistic diagnosis of its Internet policies, digital environment and thereby the structural causes of digital inequalities’. It was set up by UNESCO’s IPDC (International Program for Development of Communication) and recently supplemented by a study on AI for sustainable development, presented on an Open Forum at IGF.

The implementation of the indicators is not surprisingly quite uneven. Tunisia is in the implementation process and does not yet have all indicators available, as its gender - internet accessibility relation cannot be determined yet. Cyber security strategies are in the implementation phase but everything ‘is still a bit messy and bureauocratic’.

South Korea presents itself as an internet champion with the index confirming the success and meeting criteria a ‘low hanging fruit’. Kenya so far established a data collecting agency (NGO). And then we have Sudan with not yet any ‘holistic diagnosis’ but 500 language groups and obviously a unique potential for digital content and innovation coming from a highly diverse oral culture landscape. A helpful lesson also if we think of inclusion and to what extent our data reflects the transplanetary reality.

Inclusion, fragmentation, privacy

Inclusion amongst disadvantaged groups was scrutinized in context of the worrying truth that the expansion of the internet goes hand in hand with a widening gap of accessibility along regional, income and gender divides. Ayobangira Safari Nshuti, invited Member of Parliament from the DR of Congo and sitting on a panel beside representatives of the OECD and ICC requested the forum to consider the non-internet people, ‘also not promoted or represented at those panels’. But inclusion is a challenge even inside ICANN. The Centre’s co-director Jan Aart Scholte together with Hortense Jongen presented a highly interesting survey on perceived inequality inside the internet’s core organization. Another obstacle to inclusion seems to develop when the internet itself is fragmented. There are different reasons for that. The wish of sovereign nation states to regulate internet communication and provide cybersecurity can, in the extreme, lead to strategies that uncouple the national grid from the global domain space (‘kill switch’). Disadvantaged groups on the other side develop local networks of sophisticated complexity and scope. These networks are active in protest movements and among marginalized groups like refugees. They have their own privacy concerns. Presentation of a network simulator software (QualNet) triggered a question how secure the system is since it operates with an open Wi-Fi port. The answer to this question was negative.
A similar development of stand-alone or de-coupled solutions can be observed in the uncanny arena of the ‘Internet of Things’. Fear of invasive manipulation is a strong trigger towards solutions that limit the openness and accessibility of ‘one net’. Trendy digital toys (machines) like Raspberry can be interpreted as a symptom of this. Marco Hogewoning, RIPE NCC, is scared by industrial IoT but even more so by home appliances, ‘the stuff you plug into your Wi-Fi’. The Mirai attack has shown that even the core infrastructure of the internet is at risk. He points out that the traditional punishment for bad behaviour of the user (‘red button’, ‘unplug the user’) is not working anymore, because the action risks cutting essential, even vital functions of the user’s environment (health applications). Device classifications are in demand and each sector, it was recommended, should design those classifications. Many aspects are only partly understood and we are far from an understanding that permits regulation. Reliability-related questions abound. A wish to include China in this regulatory effort was uttered. When the device’s lifetime might well exceed the producer’s lifetime, a special product classification might also be asked for, indicating an option to use that ‘thing’ - with specified capabilities - offline at will.

Legal challenge & the norm entrepreneur

Among legal professionals the internet may be a cause to enter new terrain because the home zone of national jurisdiction becomes intertwined with legal obligations of other countries when a company or server technology is affected by third country legislation. Judge Adlin Abdul Majid from Malaysia testified to this challenge. It is one thing to harmonize jurisdiction related to policy fields like freedom of speech, cybercrimes and privacy law. It is yet another issue to develop shared regulation in arising fields of policy. The Internet and especially the internet economy provides for one such new field and demands coordination of norms and their application.

Darian Pavli from the EUGH provided cases of government interference, were the court went behind national jurisdiction (Estonia) but also cases where even national jurisdiction was already violated (Turkey). Beyond the principle of ‘notice and take down’ for hate speech, judge Pavli, in light of the gravity and frequency of what is at stake, joins a growing consensus that the platforms need to do more. That the legal system in the US provides almost complete immunity for intermediaries with respect to hate speech on their platforms seems to be a major obstacle for an international consensus.

However, norms and consensus are in demand wherever greater societal change is planned. Olaf Kolkman, Chief Internet Technology Officer, Internet Society (ISOC), spoke of himself and others as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the context of a Canadian IoT-Security Multistakeholder project, which sounds a little bit like a commodification of norms, knocking at heaven’s door. Will there be norms mushrooming like FTAs in the process? Yet one of the questions the IGF gave reason to ask.

Always a good read: the Centre’s Alumni Fellow Blayne Haggart
Future internet governance strategy of the EU

A panel on the future Internet governance strategy of the EU nicely reflected the global impact of the European debate. Internet governance everywhere is in a state of transition with new technologies like AI, blockchain and 5G networks upcoming. This transformation is about to change not only technical, political or economic processes. This is a basic societal transformation and questions the normative underpinnings of societies around the world (Julia Pohle, WZB). And while Europe is not often the place from where technical innovations originate, the European culture of societal integration of those new developments, accompanied with a culture of multistakeholder diplomacy and consensus building, is an important contribution for the sustainable development also of the values, norms and regulations that safeguard technological development and emerging applications.

Andrea Beccalli, Director Stakeholder Engagement, ICANN, underlined that the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has set a standard. Other countries around the world have followed this legislation, from Japan and Argentina, to Brazil, several African countries, and recently California.

Norms and Cybersecurity

Strategies to limit the effect of cyber attacks between states involve a highly specialized technical community, CERTs and network operator groups (NOG), who are the first responders and possible implementers of the rules. A cyber-diplomacy dialogue exists since the last four IGFs, involving also diplomats and policy makers. Technical experts and diplomats have a different understanding of both norms and solutions. Alejandro Pisanty (National University of Mexico) sees different regimes at work here and a preparedness to seek ‘legitimacy by effectiveness’. If an infection spreads as encrypted data through VPNs of corporate networks, even national CERTs cannot intervene. The problem here seems to be partly related to a difference in the afforded procedures. Louise Marie Hurel (Cybersecurity Governance Researcher, LSE) asked about the implementation of one particular norm, Norm 7 of the GGE report of 2015, that says that states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. Merike Kaeo (Strategic Security Leadership & ICANN Board Member), who was involved in the response to a 2007 attack on Estonia, interestingly reported from that incident, where due to not-yet-established levels of trust, such kind of assistance did not happen:

it was unprecedented … they had established a national CERT. And they actually were at a conference just around that time with other national CERTs, but the problem was they were so new they hadn’t yet built the appropriate trust relationships. When they asked for help, people were trying to figure out could they trust them or not.

Ilona Stadnik scrutinizes this topic in much more detail and with much more expertise in her contribution to this magazine.

Compilation: Martin Wolf
Why Populism will not Trash International Organizations: a Weberian Perspective

Jens Steffek

When it comes to the future of international organizations (IO) and multilateralism, the mood is sombre among internationalists. Populist leaders, from Trump to Bolsonaro, have turned their backs on multilateral institutions and rule-based global governance, apparently inaugurating a new age of aggressive nationalism and power politics. In the meantime, the European Union (EU) faces the first member country leaving the union, or at least trying to do so for more than three years. Do these developments imply that the age of IOs is coming to an end? Were public IOs, as some argue, a phenomenon of the 20th century?

In this article I argue that, as institutions, IOs are very unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. My prediction is based on a Weberian reading of IOs as internationalized instances of what he called Fachbürokratie, or expert bureaucracy. I take from Weber not only the insight that the raison d’être of expert bureaucracies is the management of functional complexities in industrial modernity, but I also underline their rationalizing function, that is, their ability to make authoritative decisions predictable – a precondition, as Weber argued, for industrial societies (and capitalism) to thrive.

Expert bureaucracies permeate the modern state, and also private institutions, to a remarkable degree. As an organizational form, expert bureaucracy is transcending levels of government and the public-private frontier. It has come in many local varieties, e.g. British, French, Soviet, Chinese, Japanese etc., which share, however, some key characteristics. Their emergence since the 19th century reflects the increasing complexity and functional differentiation of modern societies. Historically, the rise of functional public international organizations (IOs) paralleled the expansion of the state and the professionalization of its apparatus. Far from being a threat to the nation-state, IOs flanked its rise and enhanced its capacity to govern. Their regulatory harmonization, their scientific advisory work, and their function as a clearinghouse of data helps the state in the management and rationalization of its own activities. Conjectures that IOs would somehow come to dismember the modern nation-state, or that citizens’ loyalties would shift to transnational political entities, have proven premature. IOs are certainly not competitors of the state but its correlates at the international level.

Why is the ‘human machine’ of expert bureaucracy so sticky as an organizational form? Weber has shown us how, in the course of modernization, political, social and economic organization became increasingly based on the application of technical and scientific knowledge, on impersonality of procedure, and capillary control of individual behaviour. An important role in the process of modernization comes to formalized and disciplined knowledge production, to reproducible experimental procedures. The spread of this knowledge was greatly helped by new ‘symbolic technologies’, such as abstract and formal language. Another general trend that permeates the public sector as well as the industrial enterprise is formalization. Written, explicit and precise norms supplant custom, implicit conventions, and oral traditions. Decisions are documented in writing and records are systematically kept. This progressive formalization of social relations helped establish control, predictability of behaviour and stabilized expectations. Calculability and predictability, Weber argued, were increasingly required by the expansion of industrial capitalism and the concomitant creation of markets for goods and services. The modern capitalist enterprise is built around techniques of prediction, calculation and elimination of uncertainty.

To be sure, the logic of professional administration has not taken over all spheres of social life. Some degree of political contingency is unavoidable, as Weber recognized, because the routine work of the administration cannot tackle fundamental value conflicts in society. Such choices must remain the prerogative of politics because there is no unambiguous ‘best solu-
tion’ that one could arrive at with the help of experts or administrators. Politics, as Weber saw it, was an agonistic struggle between rivaling conceptions of the good life. Since these conceptions were irreconcilable, compromises between them were impossible.

Interestingly, today’s populists often draw precisely on such ideas. The promise of populism is to reconquer autonomous political space and to implement the ‘true’ values and preferences of citizens. To achieve this, they fight against established elites, ‘the unelected’, ‘technocracy’ and the ‘big state’. Populists not only target IOs and the European Union but at the same time domestic bureaucracies, science and experts more generally. They reject the primary justification for delegating tasks to independent agencies (IOs among them) and seek to undermine their legitimacy. Instead of functional necessity, scientific findings or formal logic, decisions should be based on the ‘will of the people’, which populists claim to know and to enact.

From the Weberian perspective that I outlined, the disadvantages of purely will-based politics come to the fore. No matter if in its left-wing or right-wing variety, populist government always comes with a good dose of unpredictability. Donald Trump’s three years in office can illustrate this problem perfectly. Independently of their content, the sheer volatility of Trump’s decisions and the lack of continuity are emerging as a major weakness. In highly developed economies such unpredictability can only last for a while, I argue, and only as long as the machinery of government is still working in the background of the political operetta. The populist simulation of ‘taking back control’ is a theatre performance for domestic consumption that will, in the end, not empower the people as some on the left and right pretend. The case of Brexit demonstrates that exit from international institutions will only reshuffle tasks to other bureaucratic institutions, and many of them will still be located at the international level. In the UK, the prospect of exiting the EU created, on the one hand, an increase in domestic expert bureaucracy, as functions formerly performed by EU institutions were re-patriated. In parallel, the WTO has enjoyed an unexpected boost in street-level popularity as Brexit campaigners promised to replace the trading rules of the EU with the rules of another international organization.

In an interdependent and accelerating world, cutting regulatory ties creates insecurity which undermines the smooth functioning of the state, the foundations of global capitalism and thus the dominant mode of welfare creation. My conclusion therefore is that the new nationalism may well damage IOs and rule-based multilateralism in the short term, but in the mid-term, highly industrialized economies will not be able to wrench from the grip of (international) bureaucracies. International governance may possibly turn away from public IOs as an institutional form to more informal networks of experts and decentralized private standard-setting. There certainly is evidence for tendencies that lead away from the Weberian model of public bureaucracy and show the increasing importance of non-state and hybrid actors active in regulation. The articles on internet governance in this issue can illustrate that tendency. My expectation is that new forms of cooperation may come to replace parts of classic intergovernmental IOs as long as they can perform the same functions, i.e., limiting contingency and creating stable expectations. Global governance in fact always oscillated between the public and the private pole. Yet written rules, formalized procedure, and technical expertise remain crucial to hybrid and private regimes as well. In the end, a more fluid and networked global governance would amount to a gestalt shift of the Fachbürokratie rather than a radical turn away from it.

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Migration as a Human Right? Theories and Practices of Global Solidarity

Stefania Maffeis

The recent public debates on search and rescue operations for refugees at risk in the Mediterranean and on a fair distribution of their ‘burden’ among countries of the EU highlight a process of erosion of the minimal humanitarian standards achieved in the past decades. At the same time, debates on the recognition of a human right to free global movement are getting louder, and provoking controversial reactions between scholars, lawyers, politicians, and the civil society. Could the recognition of the human right to free global movement be a possible way out of the current political and humanitarian crisis, an effective tool of global cooperation and solidarity, and of protection of vulnerable subjects?

Even if the current dramatic situation urges for prompt, valid answers, I think one should consider the potential entailed in the question itself, and analyse the conditions of its possibility, the different social fields in which it circulates and the multiple perspectives from which it is debated. My approach of analysing the question, instead of giving immediate answers, is endorsed by a specific situational understanding of human rights. Along this understanding, the meaning(s) and the normative function(s) of human rights are not universal, unchangeable and necessary, but plural and contingent. That’s why I argue that the questions of if and how the recognition of a human right to global mobility is useful and necessary can be answered only inductively and partially, through the observation of different practices of it being bargained in specific historical and social contexts. My current research project aims at broadly reconstructing some of these practices in the field of political theory and of political social movements in different European countries. In this short article, I would like to focus on a document, the Charter of Palermo (Orlando et al. 2015), which was written in 2015 as a result of the public conference ‘Io sono persona’ (I am human) in the capital of Sicily, and has become an important reference for the transnational networks ‘solidarity cities’, and ‘from the sea to the city’. But, before coming to the charter, a brief explanation of my methodological and theoretical approach is required, since the political, situational understanding of human rights I am here endorsing is neither obvious nor uncontroversial.

Situational political understandings of human rights reflect and hold a structural tension between two traditional notions of human rights, the moral and the juridical one. The moral notion conceives human rights as duties and privileges that human beings enjoy in virtue of their humanity, independently of their belonging to specific political communities. Human rights are, insofar, universal foundational grounds and limiting instruments of positive, codified laws. But the claim of universality presupposes a metaphysical or religious, thus not universally recognizable, conception of an unchangeable human nature, and an unsustainable unhistorical grand narrative of an unchanged meaning of human rights (Raz 2007; Moyn 2012). The juridical notion interprets human rights instead as codified international norms that regulate the relation between states or between citizens of different states, but that also protect the rights of individuals against arbitrary uses of the state’s power. The juridical notion of human rights is challenged by the problem of the entangledness between the state’s and the international juridical scales. Because human rights are the rights of all human beings, granted by international conventions, but at the same time they are actualized (or violated) by states that decide sovereignly above their migration and membership policies (Arendt 1958: 290–304; on the dilemma between the individual right to political membership and the collective right to exclude see in guise of overview Cassese 2016). Conceived as already existing positive norms that define which specific social group under which condition should be protected, human rights are also instruments of identification and division, not of cohesion and defense of humanity.

Along a political situational understanding, human rights are critical instruments of problematizing the borders of both realms, of morality and of law (overview in Baynes 2009; Kreide 2016). Human rights are characterized by a structural ambivalence, being involved on one hand in practices of ‘territorialization’, of definition of specific social groups allocated to specific spaces and rights, and on the other hand, in practices of ‘detrimentalization’, of claiming and ac-
tualizing universal human equality beyond any form of identification or categorization (Balibar 2009; Fassin 2012). This political dialectical nature of human rights is condensed in the formula of the ‘right to have rights’, coined first by Hannah Arendt and highly debated in the political philosophy of migration in the last two decades (Arendt 1958; Honig 2006; Benhabib 2006; Gündoğdu 2015). Along the agonistic interpretation of this formula, the ‘right to have rights’ is a right to belong to political communities, to act and to be recognized as active citizens, independently from any formal status. The specific meaning and function of this right is neither absolute nor fixed; it emerges rather when people generally excluded from a questioned political community become visible, and in so doing change existing divisions and perceptions of the public space (Rancière 2004).

The political understanding of human rights underlines their performative character. Human rights are not so important for what they exactly mean or for their normative ground, but for what they do, or for what is done with them (Hoover 2016). Human rights are circulating ‘ideas’: enunciations, claims, visions, and practices that, through their iteration and translation between different social fields, times, languages, and countries progressively get the status of collective ‘matters of concern’ (Latour 2004), eventually of codified rights. In this sense, the normative and political power of human rights can be framed as an issue of translation (Bachman-Medick 2013).

This brings me finally to the Charter of Palermo: ‘International Human Mobility. From migration as suffering to mobility as an inalienable human right. Io sono persona’ (Orlando et al. 2015). Next to the word ‘persona’ we see the symbol of a fingerprint. Persona, a Latin name for ‘citizen with rights’ and a religious one for ‘god’s creature’ with a long tradition in the history of human rights (Joas 2016), is used here as a critique of the practices of identification imposed by the Dublin III agreement, which forbids migrants to move to European countries other than the first country of arrival. The charter is a joint statement of the mayor of Palermo Leoluca Orlando together with international and local NGOs, scholars and lawyers from different Italian universities, and the former High Commissioner of the United Nations of Refugees (UNHCR). Written in the style of a declaration or manifesto, the charter is divided in different articles. The first one defines international mobility as an inalienable human right to choose ‘where to live, live better and without dying’ (Orlando et a. 2015: 2). Mobility is framed as a human right in opposition to the dominating paradigms of emergency and security. The charter promotes the abolition of the permit to stay, and the implementation of a transnational citizenship, intended as the daily, political and supportive cohabitation beyond any formal citizenship status. The legal recognition of an inalienable right to global mobility is described as a long run goal, achievable through multilevel interventions and policies. Nevertheless, the right to mobility is or should be handled as an already existing fact: ‘It is equally clear that there’s the need to act right now ‘as if’ mobility already were an inalienable human right’ (Ibid.: 3).

The call for an ‘as if’ policy of a human right to global mobility, resonating with Kant’s practical philosophy, has already had performative effects: the charter has been translated in different languages, promoted at the UN Habitat program ‘safer city’ among the Global Parliament of Mayors (http://www.palermoworld.it/eng/palermo-one-of-the-strong-cities-2/), quoted as main reference in the website of the European solidarity city network (https://solidarity-city.eu/en/downloads-links-2/), as well in sociological analyses of this movement (Bauder 2017; Kron/Christoph 2019; Schillinger 2019), mentioned in processes and parliament deliberations on search and rescue operations (Aguilar 2019), and it has finally given a name to a political platform, the Palermo Charter Platform Process, in which scholars, lawyers, NGOs, social activists, and political representatives of European cities involved in search and rescue and welcoming operations towards refugees in the Mediterranean are making pressure in their different fields of action for putting an end to the criminalization of global migration, of sea rescue, and of solidarity (Forschungsgesellschaft Flucht & Migration e.V. 2019).

The circulation pathways of the Palermo Charter are one illustrative example of current practices of debating a human right to global movement. They show that a process of recognition of this right is possible
and has already begun, that claiming this human right as a circulating idea is a way of challenging and responding to the crises of the European migration regime, of reflecting anew and transforming traditional concepts like citizenship, solidarity and cooperation.

References


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Games that change the future? - ‘Enter Africa’

Hannah Grüttgen

Predicting the future of an African megacity sounds like something only experts can do. However, a new African game project makes it possible for everyone.

Enter Africa is a pan-African project run by the Goethe-Institut, in which young interdisciplinary teams in 15 African cities south of the Sahara have developed digital games that intercorporate the cities’ past, present and future. Eighteen new megacities are expected to emerge in the area by 2025 – a future that comes with great challenges for resources, infrastructure and culture. Since the transformation processes are very complex, expertise from various fields is needed. Thus, Enter Africa has created a creative pan-African network by bringing together teams of young local urban planners, architects, IT experts, cultural workers, and engineers who have developed ideas for 15 major African cities from Kinshasa (Kongo) to Kampala (Uganda). Their shared ideas have flowed directly into the development of transnational location-based digital games about future scenarios of African cities. In this way, the Goethe-Institut project wants to actively think ahead and plan transformation processes.

Using gamification, Enter Africa aims to playfully address some of the most crucial issues and challenges on the African continent while simultaneously creating a network and promoting the African gaming scene to finally bring African games made in Africa onto the market. All participants share a strong pan-African thought and the urge the players to challenge globally ruling narratives about Africa. It offers a narrative of a continent that offers not only problems to solve but also enormous creativity. The project pursues the ultimate mission of connecting people from Africa and around the world by using science, technology and innovation to create and tell authentic African stories through games.

Using their smartphones, players are able to explore major African cities and face local, social or environmental challenges by taking certain roles. While symbols, figures and themes provide a glimpse into the respective culture, the game subjects all revolve around exactly those topics that are of biggest relevance to the locals. In the process of gamification, problems or prejudices can be addressed without pushing anyone into a certain corner – a scenario which, for example, enables a white South African to virtually take up the role of a township resident in Soweto. Ultimately, the created situations take you to places which you would most likely not visit otherwise and additionally confront you with local challenges that give a great insight and better understanding of the region. For instance, in the game created by the team in Accra, players have to visit Agbogbloshie, Africa’s biggest garbage dump, and fight a monster made of electronic waste. In the game from Nairobi you need to fight against a virus which embodies corruption while in the Ethiopian game, taking place in Addis, the challenge is to accept different identities and ethnic groups in order to win.

In addition to the location-based digital games, all 15 local teams have joined forces to design a collective analog African ‘megagame’ that cuts across national borders and is called Busara. Instead of being confined to the challenges of a single selected country, this boardgame involves cross-border cooperation and clever regional resource management to pursue the shared dream of establishing one strong African culture. The project-participants all agree – through the creation of mutual understanding and knowledge their games can make a change in Africa’s future.

The 15 app-based digital games and also the board game were published in August 2019 and presented at various events in Africa as well as at the games fairs A Maze and Gamescom in Germany. They are available on the official website: https://www.goethe.de/prj/eaf/de/index.html.

Hannah Grüttgen, Student Assistant in Communications at the Centre, reports this project which came to the Centre’s attention because her predecessor Nina Fink is currently a Project Assistant in Addis Ababa for Enter Africa.
The European Parliament Research Service is the European Parliament’s in-house expertise-providing institution, which helps elected members of the parliament do their jobs better. They also organize, once a year, an annual lecture. On November 6, 2019, Wolfram Kaiser, who is currently a Senior Research Fellow at our Centre, delivered the European Parliament Research Service Annual Lecture in Brussels, on transnational governance in post-war Europe. We sat down with him after the event, for a quick chat on his lecture, and on how his reading of European history can be strategized to solve some of the European Union’s current problems.

QM | Tell us a little about the main arguments you put forth at this lecture.

Wolfram Kaiser: My lecture this year focused on the three modes of governance (in addition to intergovernmental negotiation among member-state governments) that have been dominant in the history of the European Union, and how they have shaped practices of cooperation amongst EU members. In recent years, there has been a lot of talk about the crisis of European democracy. The European Union, as an attempt at a transnational incarnation of democracy, has been attacked by both the radical Left and the Right in many EU member states, accompanied by nationalist rhetoric. Many observe that the formal decision-making processes in the EU make it harder for citizens to understand the EU or identify with its spirit, and that this alienation is one of the main causes of the current crisis of the European democracy. However, in my lecture, I argue that this is not so.

To understand this crisis, it is important to locate three main notions and practices of transnational governance that have profoundly shaped the EU and how it functions today. Each of these practices, with roots going back to the 19th century, sought to overcome certain drawbacks of traditional forms of intergovernmental decision-making in international organizations like the League of Nations or the United Nations. The first governance tradition is what Johan Schot and I have called ‘technocratic internationalism’ — which goes back to the 19th Century, and was advanced by a lot of experts who had technological expertise in certain areas, like the construction of railway lines, specifics of safety provisions for trains, security measures for cross-border travel and so on. The EU borrowed from here this idea of running itself as independently as possible without interference from foreign ministries, thereby addressing regulatory challenges as well as keeping national interests articulated by governments in check. This tradition was practiced already during the First World War in Europe, by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, for example, and by Jean Monnet, whose vision co-shaped the EU after the Second World war. Monnet was involved with managing allied shipping and shipping tonnage, with a view towards ending the war as soon as possible. After 1945, this practice was heavily reflected in the European Coal and Steel Community’s High Authority and the way Monnet initially ran it as its president. The second type of practices in play were those of neo-corporatism, concertation and consensus-seeking, which determined the way in which transnational industry cooperation in Europe worked. This can be traced back to the European cartel traditions, with the end-of-19th century steel car-
This highly informal, coordinated dynamic between business interests and political institutions also shaped the relationship between businesses and trade unions, and their work with the governments within the broader context of European integration. And the third and final component that has shaped how the EU works today is the vision of ‘Europeanizing’ parliamentary democracy, to make it similar to any other national European parliamentary system, thereby overcoming intergovernmental cooperation by replacing it with a full-fledged constitutional solution, along the lines of other federal states. This third practice has resulted in the direct elections of the European Parliament, and its strengthening in the EU system.

Each of these traditions has deep roots in history, and they have solidified into interconnected practices over time, but they are actually associated with three very different notions of transnational democracy. These traditions are also often incompatible. For example, the impetus for federalism came in the 70s from the idea that the European Commission was operating too much as a technocracy. This period also marked the beginning of a discourse on a democratic deficit in the EU, which fostered demands for a state-like structure and powers to European institutions. Interestingly, this very discourse of the democratic deficit is misappropriated by the modern-day populists and now used against the European Union as a whole, but for very different purposes, i.e. to reclaim power for member-state governments. Over the years, these practices have clashed and often blurred into each other, and this blurring, I argue, is what has made the EU’s mode of working confusing and inaccessible to the citizens.

QM | Would a new way of looking at these traditions offer solutions to EU’s current crises, or would one need a bigger overhaul?

Wolfram Kaiser: Well, while this is a normative question, the problem happens to be a systemic one, similar to the US, where in the beginning the Constitution saw a lot of changes and then over the centuries it has become quite rigid, in case of the EU too, it is likely that for the moment the Lisbon Treaty is the last treaty change. There could be changes in practices, but a major overhaul of the system is unlikely.

QM | The populist narratives in the EU today pose this democratic crisis as a problem that needs immediate solutions. Would you say then, that understanding the history of these three traditions could help counter populist nationalist narratives in EU member states?

Wolfram Kaiser: Yes, well firstly, understanding the history and the origins of these practices and these discourses makes it clear that these systems have deep roots and cannot be changed overnight. Institutions need to adapt, but they of course adapt much more slowly than the problems around them. So I think contextualizing these practices advocates for more tolerance for a slow systemic change, which comes for example with the need for consensus that is essential in an organization as heterogenous as the EU. And that is a valuable counter narrative to the rise of populist rhetoric in the EU today, to understand the fundamentally different ways in which slow consensus building has to work in the EU, which simply cannot be run like a small, ethnically cohesive nation state, like Slovenia, for example.

Interview conducted by Mouli Banerjee

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Faith in the Time of the Internet: Notes from a Workshop

Giulia Evolvi

Digitization (or ‘digitalization’) affects many areas of contemporary life. In societies where interactions are conditioned by the presence of digital media, religion also needs to adapt to the proliferation of new technologies. Historically, religion has always been mediated, because it is based on systems of communications among individuals and communities, from oral transmissions to sacred texts, from sermons to global-scale proselytism. Nowadays, the encounter with the Internet has an impact on religious believers, leaders, and institutions. If digital spaces offer new venues for the expression of religious feelings and the articulation of religious practices, they also enhance the possibilities for the emergence of new authorities and anti-religious narratives. The result is what Heidi Campbell defines as ‘digital religion’, a type of religion that is specifically influenced by digitization.

Studying digital religion helps understand contemporary religious change. At the Center for Religious Studies (CERES), Ruhr University Bochum, we explore digitization in relation to religious contact. In specific, the Käte Hamburger Kolleg project in Bochum looks at encounters between different religious groups and negotiations within given traditions. Many of the phenomena that digitization influences – such as religious conflicts, conversions, migrations – may be understood as forms of religious contact. Therefore, CERES hosted the international workshop ‘Digitalization and Religious contact’, held on 14-15 November in Bochum. The workshop has been organized in partnership with the Center for Advanced Internet Studies (CAiS), also based in Bochum, which helped to balance the religious studies perspective with a digitization perspective.

The workshop kindled discussions about several aspects of digital religion. For instance, religious identity is increasingly negotiated in online environments. Mona Abdel-Fadil presented a case study of the Pope’s Instagram account as a symbolic resource to counter Islamophobia and racism. Nadia Zasanska and Rasool Akbari discussed femininity and the female body through the examples of Orthodox Christian blogs in Russian, which advocate for traditional gender roles, and social media campaigns for Iranian women to remove the hijab, to reclaim agency on gender norms. Through these discussions and other interesting presentations, the workshop showed how digitization influences religious groups and individuals in creating spaces of contact with other religious groups, and venues of negotiation of religious practices and values.

References and further readings


The Center for Religious Studies (CERES) at the Ruhr University Bochum was founded as a Käte Hamburger Kolleg and does research on a broad range of topics. An overview is provided here: https://ceres.rub.de/en/research/profile/.
Event Report

Fridays for Future

New Coalitions of Change for Just & In-time Climate Protection?

The 15th Käte Hamburger Dialogue, hosted on 11 November 2019 at the United Nations Campus, Bonn on the issue of climate change, turned into not only a scintillating conversation, but also an event that was an endorsement of the best elements of our Centre’s Dialogues brought together. It was an instance of great collaboration between the Centre, the United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Dialogue, titled ‘New coalitions of change for just & in-time climate protection?’, not only engaged in conversations of global cooperation for climate policies, but gave the audience the opportunity to listen to truly different perspectives from actors who are pivotal in the cooperation process, young activists, officials from institutions like the UN, and academics and researchers on climate change from the Global South.

The Dialogue was also timely, in the context of the rising popularity of the Fridays for Future movement, whose relevance was the central theme that was discussed. The UN Summit of the Secretary General of the UN in September 2019 made clear that accelerating climate action is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change. In this light, the success of Fridays for Future as a transnationally organized movement, which has been having an impact on political and economic decisions worldwide, is undeniable. Dirk Messner (Director, UNU-EHS and Co-Director, KHK/GCR21) moderated the session, and began by contextualizing the Paris Agreement and the perceived impact of Fridays for Future. Niclas Svenningsen (UNFCCC) provided an institutional view, underscoring the time it takes to arrive at large-scale global agreements like the Paris Agreement, and saw Fridays for Future as a sign of hope as well as an indication of a new youth-led approach changing the ways in which the future of climate policies may be headed. A comparatively young voice on the panel Fatin Tawfig (Climate Fellow at UNFCCC / UNU-EHS), provided the perspective of a climate activist who has been actively engaged in the scenes of climate-based movements across the globe. She recognized in Fridays for Future a change in not just the narrative but also strategies and tactics of protest, which would be useful for other movements to adopt, and reiterated the necessity of the passion and urgency with which the movement has been built. A much needed perspective on this from the Global South was provided by Andrés López Rivera from International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy (IMPRS-SPCE), who spoke of the need to note that the movement has not spread at the same level in the Global South yet. Giving examples from Latin America, he noted that there was great learning potential for the Fridays for Future movement from the indigenous climate activists working with their local communities. The Dialogue saw enthusiastic audience participation, with questions on how socio-economic rights, and protests for better public transport and infrastructure are intrinsically linked to climate policies. The event opened up new debates and focused on the urgent need for targeted action, and ended on an optimistic note, with hope in Fridays for Future having a global, sustainable, positive impact. (MB)
Event Report

David Victor on the Paris Climate Agreement

I incentivizing Leadership among States

On 30 October 2019, the Käte Hamburger Kollege/Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21) held its 33rd Käte Hamburger Lecture, at Universität Duisburg-Essen. The lecture was delivered by David Victor, Professor at the School of Global Policy & Strategy, UC San Diego and renowned authority on climate policy.

The lecture, titled ‘Is the Paris Agreement Working?’, evaluated the impact and limitations of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Victor began with an assessment of Paris as turning point in methods of international diplomacy for climate policy. As a global response to the threat of catastrophic climate change, Paris offered a fresh approach to fostering cooperation among countries to address the imminent climate crisis. By design, it was more flexible and inclusive than earlier agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol. However, from our current vantage point, four years after the agreement, the lecture took stock of the evidence to ask whether it is indeed working. Victor suggested, using empirical evidence, that even if successful, the Agreement is unlikely to yield changes in policy that are consistent with the widely discussed goals of stopping warming at 1.5 to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. However, it is too early yet to dismiss the Agreement. The lecture stressed the need to refocus what needs to be at the center of our climate change conversations- the push for technological advancements, and the need to involve and incentivize the private sector in this direction. Delving into theories of industrial transformation, the lecture explained how the Paris process (and efforts in parallel with Paris) can radically accelerate emission reductions. Aiming towards a more solution-oriented, hopeful conclusion to the lecture, Victor called for the need to look at leadership amongst countries that are already doing comparatively well in terms of Paris targets through a brand-new paradigm. He suggested that the problem with states in relation to reduction of emission is that the better states do, the less politically relevant they become to the problem. Therefore, countries that are performing well and are willing to and capable of spending more on new technologies, shirk from doing more, as that would mean losing some negotiating power on tables of global climate diplomacy. Victor, in this lecture, suggested instead a new model of leadership, where the states are incentivized to do more by positioning them as leaders who provide research and technology to other countries, and thus narrativize their roles differently.

The first discussant to the lecture was Takeshi Kuramochi, Climate Policy Researcher at the New Climate Institute, Cologne, and Guest Researcher at the Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University, who spoke about the empirical research on the rise in global temperatures and on the need for a reassessment of the temperature caps calculated at the Paris Agreement. Next, Amanda Machin, Interim Professor of International Political Studies, Faculty of Management and Economics, Witten/Herdecke University, discussed the role of socio-political factors and not just technological breakthroughs in climate policy. This was followed by a lively round of questions from the audience, on the political rhetoric of a climate ‘emergency’ and on the need for a bottom-up approach to climate policy as well. In conclusion, the lecture provided a sober assessment of the Paris Agreement and a fresh perspective from which to look at the current crisis. (MB)
Matias E Margulis, Assistant Professor in International Political Economy at the University of Edinburgh and a former Canadian representative at the OECD, the FAO and the WTO, started the 34th Käte Hamburger Lecture by introducing the topic of global food security. Food insecurity is one of the most pressing problems facing humanity today. Currently over 800 Million people worldwide are affected and the number is increasing. And there is growing concern that food security can be further provided due to population growth, urbanization and environmental change. Food security has been put at the heart of the SDG agenda, which has the target of ending world hunger by 2030. The global food crisis in 2008 and 2011 led to social unrest and was a trigger for the ‘Arab Spring’ movements. In reaction to that, a growing number of countries have started to bolster domestic food consumption. Food as a policy problem intersects with environment, human rights and international trade. Therefore different international organizations (IO) are involved. And there is contestation among those actors. For Margulis the global governance of food security has the characteristics of a ‘regime complex’, where different international organizations, agreements and issue areas overlap. This tends to be the new normal, since we find few areas of global governance where we have stand-alone, fully integrated regimes. This fragmented landscape of global governance leads to strategies like forum shopping, because it is less clear which organization is in the lead and bargaining between organizations might be an option, producing strategic inconsistencies. Margulis identifies a kind of behaviour here that was according to him, previously unrecognized: intervention, which refers to a self-directed action by one IO with the intention to alter or reverse the decision by another organization that it perceives to undermine its own mission and goals. Margulis stresses that this is different from competition and subsequently demonstrates that multiple United Nations agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have intervened in global trade rule-making at the World Trade Organization in an effort to steer the rules toward outcomes that protect global food security. He identifies four intervention strategies: IOs can mobilize states in the target organization to effect change; IOs can use public shaming to change a decision; they can invoke an alternative legal system suggesting that the decision is inconsistent with international law; and IOs can take sides with groups of states in the target organization to balance the decision in its favour. The lecture was commented upon by Angela Heucher from DEval, the German Institute for Development Evaluation. She took up the speakers depiction of a landscape of fragmented governance with inconsistencies which comes also with space for IOs to act and they seem to be quite successful in this. She suspected whether intervention, while not weakening the target organization at will, nevertheless might have a weakening effect, undermining legal authority for example by bringing alternative legal frameworks into play. She also asked whether interview partners in LDCs would have a different view than IOs pursuing not least their own agenda. Cornelia Ulbert, who moderated the lecture, provided a related argument, speaking about the possibility of specific strategies that are in the habit, so to speak, of certain IOs like the WFP, having worked with public shaming in a systematic, conscious way since a long time. (MW)
Upcoming Events (Spring 2020)

21/01 Migration
2nd Global Migration Lecture
Familial Migrations: Class, Gender, and Global Inequalities
Eleonore Kofman, LSE, Middlesex University London
16–17:30
Mercatorsaal (Gerhard-Mercator-Haus), Lotharstraße 57, 47057 Duisburg

11/02 Security
35th Käte Hamburger Lecture
Critique Without Judgement
Marieke de Goede, University of Amsterdam
18–19:30
LS 105 (NRW School of Governance), Lotharstraße 53, 47057 Duisburg

12/03 Nachhaltigkeit
16th Käte Hamburger Dialogue
Podiumsdiskussion im Rahmen der Duisburger Akzente 2020
Das Glücksversprechen der Nachhaltigkeit
18:30-20:00
VHS im Stadtfenster, Steinsche Gasse 26, 47051 Duisburg

16–17/04 Communication
2nd Annual Conference
Communicative Power and Global Cooperation
KHK/Centre for Global Cooperation Research and Main Research Area Transformation of Contemporary Societies’ at the University of Duisburg-Essen
Gerhard-Mercator-Haus, University of Duisburg-Essen

21/04 Environment
36th Käte Hamburger Lecture
Climate and Capitalists: The Long History of Business and Global Governance of the Environment
Glenda Sluga, European University Institute, Florence (from 2020)

Subject to changes. For newest info, please consult our website. You are invited to follow our livestreams and share your thoughts with our team on Twitter.
Katja Freistein, Frank Gadinger, Christine Unrau

From the author’s abstract: In this paper, we ask how exactly right-wing populists make anti-globalization appealing. We follow the growing interest in the ambivalent features of populist language and performances by suggesting a methodological framework around narratives, metaphors, and emotions. We argue that right-wing populists skillfully present abstract phenomena of globalization and translate them to individual experiences of ‘ordinary people’. Metaphors play a crucial role in populist storytelling as they make sense of a complex reality through imagery. They mobilize collective emotions and reach a wider audience through a high degree of linguistic adaptability and normative ambiguity. We demonstrate these narrative operations using two recent cases of ‘successful’ right-wing populist, anti-globalization storytelling, which build on strong metaphors. One is the metaphor of the ‘House’, used by former Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, and the other is U.S. President Donald Trump’s metaphor of ‘The Wall’ (...).
Reviews


With the growing academic interest in polycentricity, this edited volume provides a comprehensive account of the concept of polycentric governance. The contributions in the volume come from experts of the field from across the globe, and with various examples from actual cases involving complex natural resource systems, they show how polycentric governance mechanisms and systems thrive and adapt and the multiple factors that affect their efficacy. The volume is also a product of an Authors’ Workshop on polycentric governance, that was hosted at the Centre in 2019. The contributions tie up closely with the Centre’s research agenda of global cooperation and polycentric governance, reflecting the engagement of Andreas Thiel, a senior research fellow at the Centre, and one of the editors of this volume.


Published as a part of our Routledge Global Cooperation Series, this book looks at the effect of nationalism and multilateralism on society and global governance. Using a comparative framework, it analyzes two models of governance- the EU, which is constitutionalized and functions within polycentric networks of multilateralism on one hand, and Northeast Asia, where the administration is nationalist and averse to multilateral commitments. The book follows the trajectories of the two regions and the critical junctures in their history of international governance, with special focus on two global governance issues- financial crisis and climate change. Using an innovative approach, Wissenbach argues that the best approach to global governance needs a balance between multilateralism and nation-centric policy making.


Books that specialize on area studies often concentrate on specific regions, and in that context, this book breaks the mould by looking at the implications of China’s rise in global power on its economic realtions with African states. Following from the the New Silk Road’s extension to Sub-Saharan Africa, this volume investigates how China’s foreign policy on Africa as an integrated, monolithic area impacts political stability within African countries, and how these decisions have in turn affected the African states economically. Edited by Hartmann and Noesselt, who bring together their own regional expertise on Africa and China respectively to the table, this book is also part of our Routledge Global Cooperation Series. It will be of great relevance to scholars of International Relations, Political Science, International Law and Economy, Security Studies, and African and Chinese Studies.

Reviews: Mouli Banerjee
Selected Publications

Received since October 2019

What follows is a list of new publications of the Centre’s current and former fellows and staff as well as authors from our wider academic network. We publish an updated list and invite you to inform us about your recent contributions to the field of global cooperation research. The published list represents a selection of titles that we feel are substantive contributions to the field.


Wissenbach, Uwe (2020). Rethinking Governance in Europe and Northeast Asia: Multilateralism and Nationalism in International Society, Global Cooperation Series, Abingdon: Routledge.
Research Agenda
A detailed elaboration of the Centre's research agenda is available on the Centre's website:
https://www.gcr21.org/research/research-agenda

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Routledge Global Cooperation Series
Series Editors: Tobias Debiel, Dirk Messner, Sigrid Quack, Jan Aart Scholte
www.routledge.com/books/series/RGC/

Rethinking Governance in Europe and Northeast Asia: Multilateralism and Nationalism in International Society
By Uwe Wissenbach
222 pages | 1 B/W Illus.
Hb: 9780367321666
eBook: 9780429317125
£115.00 | £92.00

China's New Role in African Politics. From Non-Intervention towards Stabilization?
Edited by Christof Hartmann, Nele Noesselt
244 pages
Hardback: 9781138392076
eBook: 9780429422393
£115.00 | £92.00

The Routledge Global Cooperation series develops innovative approaches to understanding, explaining, and answering one of the most pressing questions of our time – how can cooperation in a culturally diverse world of nine billion people succeed?

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ISSN 2198-0403 (Online)
doi: 10.14282/2198-0403- GD-[issue]

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